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' i?ho Qt^dy eeposts four experlEaento t h e purpose ot each 
of wliich was tio ascer ta in t t e e f fec t of cogaitiv© dlssonanco 
upon r iak-taklBd behaviour in ceia t ion t o each one of four 
panrstmoXity vor iab los , nanseXy* anxiety, intemal-Qsctomal 
Xocuo of cont ro l aoif-osteem, an<S £epres3ic»i-^»:^&itissatioa. 
ThB effoct of co03i t ive diss^ianco upon r i sk - tak ing 
behaviour wao studied on certaiUi geounda. t h a t <i) i9hen tho 
s s ar© •taalt-involvod*, i . e . , ace required t o b e ctoioetivo, in 
©xpresaing t h a i r opinion, any comtmicat ion which i a diacrepent 
^ i t h t h a i r ex ia t ing opinion w i l l arouae c o ^ i t i v e dissonance, 
and in a r i^^- tak ing a i tua t ion %h& 3s are e^qpectad t o bo *ta8k~ 
oriented* in so f a r as t ! ^y are niquired t o be object ive in 
t h e i r choice of r i sk a l t e r n a t i v e s each r i sk a l t e r n a t i v e being 
based on inforroatious ind ica t ing p robab i l i ty of success and amount 
of payoff I a i^ ( i i ) the re has been scant a t t en t ion t o study the 
e f fec t of cognit ive dissonance upon r i sk - t ak ing behaviour. 
Assuming t h a t the manner of reducing cogni t ive disstonance of 
an individual nay be re la ted t o h i s positioxi on adjustment^ 
iaala<Sjustii»nt dimension in aucb a «ay t h a t a f a c i l i t a t i v e 
SQSponae involving atdjustmants and necessary modifications 
bein0 used by a well-adjusted individual and a d e b i l i t a t i v o 
one involving sonie kind of defense s^chanisnt being used by 
a maladjusted ind iv idua l , / the four persona l i ty variables# 
n&mlY* anxiety, intoEnal-exteenal locus of con t ro l , s e l f , 
estecan, and repress i on - sens i t i e a t i c^ -•> each of which 
considaced t o play a v i t a l ro le in t t o cdjuotinemt-c^ladjuetnient 
of an individual —- '^ero included in the present study, / 
Every e«p3rJjsont employod a 2 x 2 f a c t o r i a l design in t^hlch 
thoro yo£o tw> independent va r i ab l e s with t\m v a r i a t i o n s of 
each vor icb le , nan^ly, (1) asousal v s . nonarousal of cogni t ive 
dissonance induced by negative feedback of los ing the ^oi^lo 
and pos i t ive fee(SQ>ack of i^imiing the ganible xespectivolyr end 
(2) !ii@h scores v s . lo%7 scores on the personal i ty diraension* 
Tho dependent v a r i ^ l e , nanaely, the r i sk - t ak ing behaviour 
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two r i sk a l t e r n a t i v e (s t ra tegy) ctK>ices in the second of two 
b ids as compared t o the f i r s t one a f t e r winning (*nonarousal 
of cogni t ive dissonanos*} o r los ing (*arousal of cogni t ive 
dissGoance *} the ganoble in a r i sk - t ak ing t a s k . 
The analyses of scores s^ M3wed t h a t the condit ion of 
' a rousa l of co^fiitive dissonance* led t o no re changes of r i s k 
s t ra tegy tbsn did the c(»tdition of 'nonarousal of cogni t ive 
disscmance ' . The analyses fu r ther revealed t h a t the *n<»iarousal 
ot cognitive dissonance* led to % tendency to sapeat a r i sk 
striitegy cm the part of both the *roiXdiy anxious' M«1 •highly 
anximis* Ss# both the • iotejmally-orientcd • and *e3etoxnally~ 
ori©ntQd» Ss# both th© »high selfo-esteero* and *lo«r self-^ 
esteeo5' s s , and also on the part of both ths 'repwisoor* aaid 
*6ensitia^r* s s . la the condition of 'aronsol of cogaitivo 
Cilosanancc, on t t o o t t e r hand, t t e '©ildly Gnxio«s* B&» th© 
internally-offiontc^* 3B, tshQ "high self-osteea* ss* ond tho 
•ropuBssor* ss elwccd significantly mose choncpo of r isk 
«3tsr;tcoy th[m did th3i r reopsctiv© coantorports in th© •hi#i 
©Cores' ©roup©. 
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C h a p t e r I 
ORIENTATION OP PROBLEM 
F e s t i n g e r ' s (1957) t h e o r y of c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e , which 
c o n s i d e r s c o g n i t i o n o r c o g n i t i v e e l e m e n t a s "any knowledge , 
o p i n i o n , o r b e l i e f abou t t h e en j / i ronmen t , abou t o n e s e l f , o r 
abou t o n e ' s b e h a v i o u r " ( P e s t i n g e r , 1957 , p . 3 ) , s t a t e s t h a t 
( a ) d i s s o n a n c e a r i s e s when tVo c o g n i t i o n s a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h e a c h o t h e r , (b ) t h e e x p e r i e n c e of d i s s o n a n c e i s 
u n c o m f o r t a b l e , and t h a t ( c ) t h e i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c i n g 
d i s s o n a n c e i s m o t i v a t e d t o r e d u c e i t and a c h i e v e c o n s o n a n c e . 
The d i s s o n a n c e may be r educed e i t h e r b y c h a n g i n g one o r more 
of t h e o t h e r w i s e i n c o n s i s t e n t c o g n i t i o n s o r b y a d d i n g new 
c o n s o n a n t c o g n i t i v e e l e m e n t s . The t h e o r y h a s l e d t o a 
s u b s t a n t i a l amount of r e s e a r c h u s i n g v a r i e d p a r a d i g m s , l i k e 
' c o u n t e r a t t i t u d i n a l b e h a v i o u r ' ( P e s t i n g e r and C a r l s m i t h , 1 9 5 9 ) , 
' p o s t - d e c i s i o n change" (Brehm, 1 9 5 6 ) , and ' d i s c r e p a n t 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' ( z imbardo , 1 9 6 0 ) , e t c . 
In many o f t h e r e s e a r c h e s t h a t have been done t o s t u d y 
t h e e f f e c t of c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e on o p i n i o n change t h e r e i s 
a good d e a l of c o n t r o v e r s y on t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e a r o u s a l o f 
c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e , s p e c i f i c a l l y , in r e s e a r c h e s u s i n g t h e 
paradigms of ' coun te ra t t i t ud ina l behaviour' and 'pos t -dec is ion 
change' the arousal of cognit ive dissonance has been questioned 
(Bern, 1967; Kelley, 1967; Gerard, Blevans and Malcolm, 1964). 
Truly speaking, in researches using these two paradigms, the 
arousal of cognitive dissonance i s not c lea r , because the 
existence of inconsistency betvreen two cognit ive elements i s 
not concretely i d e n t i f i a b l e . I t is only in the researches 
using the paradigm of 'discrepant communication' t ha t the 
existence of inconsistency between two cognit ive elements i s 
concretely iden t i f i ab le , because in these researches discrepant 
communication is provided by the experimenter, and hence i s 
manipulable by him. 
Certain important questions a r i s e regarding the researches 
using the paradigm of 'discrepant communication' in which the 
inconsistency between two cognit ive elements i s concretely 
i d e n t i f i a b l e : What i s a discrepant communication? Does a 
discrepant communication necessa r i ly arouse cognit ive 
dissonance? When wil l a discrepant communication arouse 
cognit ive dissonance? several authors (Derlega, 1972; Zimbardo, 
1960) consider involvement in the cognitive elements to be an 
important var iable which affects the magnitude of cognit ive 
dissonance. However, as Kiesler e t a l . (1969), while discussing 
the question of involvement in the arousal of cognit ive 
dissonance, have pointed out, the concept of involvement has 
not been c l ea r ly defined in terms of the antecedent condit ions 
which produce i t , o r the manner one can vary i t both in degree 
and in type . In fact , d i f fe ren t experimental procedures 
have been employed t o induce involvement so tha t i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o say which one of these procedures i s more 
appropr ia te . 
In order to c l a r i f y the meaning of involvement as i t 
r e l a t e s t o the arousal of cognit ive dissonance, i t i s important 
t o note the observation made by Festinger (1957), tha t i f two 
cognit ive elements are dissonant with one another the magnitude 
of the cognit ive dissonance w i l l be a function of the 
importance of the cognitive elements. What Fest inger seems 
to mean by the above mentioned observation i s tha t cogni t ive 
dissonance would be aroused in an individual when both the 
cognit ive elements, i . e . , the one implied in his opinion tha t 
has already been accepted by him and the other implied in the 
discrepant information tha t i s being communicated now are 
important from the point of view of the ind iv idua l . Now, the 
question a r i s e s as t o what are the condit ions vmder which the 
two cogni t ive elements would asxime importance for the ind iv idua l . 
Empirical data seem to suggest tha t the importance of the 
two cognit ive elements i s contingent upon the type of 
involvement experienced by the individual in a given s i t u a t i o n . 
If the individual i s 'ego-involved' with regard t o the opinion 
he i s expressing on a p a r t i c u l a r issue, i . e . , i s keen t o 
express h i s own personal b e l i e f s and values, the cognit ive 
element of the opinion he holds wi l l ce r t a in ly assume importance 
for him and the cognitive element of any communicated information 
4 
which i s discrepant with the opinion he holds wi l l be 
i r re levan t and unimportant t o him. If, on the other hand, 
the individual i s ' task- involved ' in expressing his opinion 
on an issue, i . e . , i s keen t o express a correc t and object ive 
view regarding tha t i ssue , then both the cogni t ive element 
of the opinion he i s holding and tha t of any information tha t 
i s discrepant with the opinion lie i s holding wi l l be important 
to him. I t follows from what has been s ta ted above, t ha t 
cognitive dissonance wi l l be aroused only when the individual 
i s ' task-involved* in expressing his opinion on an issue and 
not when he i s 'ego-involved' in expressing h i s opinion. 
In the l i gh t of the aforementioned ana lys i s , i t seems 
possible t o resolve the divergence between the findings of 
two experiments, one car r ied out by Zirobardo (1960) and the 
other by Derlega (1972). zimbardo repor ts an experiment in 
which Ss with 'high involvement' show g rea te r amount of change 
in t h e i r opinion than do Ss with 'low involvement', when an 
information which i s discrepant with the opinion they hold i s 
given t o them, and the opinion change increases as the 
discrepancy between the opinion the ss hold and the communicated 
information increases . Contrairy t o t h i s f inding, Derlega 
reports an experiment in which ss with 'low-involvement• show an 
increase in t h e i r opinion change as the discrepancy between 
t h e i r opinion and the commxinicated information increases . 
whereas Ss with 'hgh-involvement • show a decrease in t h e i r 
opinion change as the discrepancy between t h e i r opinion and 
the communicated information increases . In both the 
experiments, the ins t ruc t ions given t o the ss t o induce 
involvement are the same, namely, t h a t 'high involvement' i s 
induced by giving the S the ins t ruc t ion t h a t the opinion 
he i s required t o express i s ind ica t ive of h i s personal i ty , 
and t h a t 'low involvement' i s induced by giving the S t>« 
ins t ruc t ion t h a t the opinion he i s required t o express has 
nothing t o do with his personal i ty , thereby appearing t o 
induce the same kind of involvement in the experimental Ss, 
i . e . , 'h ighly involved' Ss . If one examines these in s t ruc t ions 
in the l igh t of the specif ic task assigned t o the Ss in the 
two experiments, one could immediately see t h a t these 
ins t ruc t ions tend t o induce 'ego-involvement' in the case of 
Derlega's Ss but in the case of zimbardo's Ss, instead of 
inducing 'ego-involvement' , these in s t ruc t ions tend t o induce 
•task-involvement ' , in zimbardo's experiment, the Ss axe 
asked t o judge the locus of blame in a case study of a 
juveni le delinquent which obviously requires them t o be 
objective in forming t h e i r opinion, and hence, when they are 
given the ins t ruc t ions t ha t the opinion they are required t o 
express i s ind ica t ive of t h e i r personal i ty they tend t o 
express tha t aspect of personal i ty which r e f l e c t s the a b i l i t y 
t o do things as best as one can according t o an externa l 
c r i t e r i o n , which may well be designated as ' t a s k - o r i e n t a t i o n ' . 
In contras t t o t h i s , in Derlega 's experiment the Ss were asked 
t o indica te t h e i r personal opinion, i . e . , an opinion having 
no ex terna l c r i t e r i o n or frame of reference but based purely 
on t h e i r own scale of preference, regarding the amount of 
time one should spend in watching the t e l e v i s i o n . Here, the 
same ins t ruc t ions obviously tend t o ]?efer t o tha t aspect of 
personal i ty which has l i t t l e to do with any object ive frame 
of reference and may be defined purely in terms of subjective 
and personal standard and c r i t e r i o n involving one ' s own ego. 
Thus, the same ins t ruc t ions seem t o have been construed 
d i f f e ren t ly by the 'high-involvement'Ss in the two experiments, 
depending on the nature of t t e task assigned t o them, with 
the resu l t t h a t the involvement of the zimbardo's Ss takes the 
fojnm of ' task-involvement• whereas the involvement of Derlega 's 
Ss takes the form of •ego-involvement'. 
When viewed in the l igh t of t h i s ana lys i s , the findings of 
Zimbardo and Delega may be regarded as not conf l i c t ing at 
a l l . The 'high-involvement' Ss of Zimbardo's experiment who 
were ' task- involved ' understandably changed t h e i r opinon for 
the sake of ob j ec t i v i t y when some relevant information which 
appeared t o be discrepant with t h e i r ex i s t ing opinion was 
communicated t o them, whereas the 'high-involvement' Ss of 
Derlega 's experiment who were 'ego-involved' ignored the 
communication which was in conf l ic t with t h e i r personal opinion. 
and hence, refused t o change t h e i r personal opinion. From 
the above discuss ion, one i s j u s t i f i e d in concluding tha t 
when the Ss are ' task^involved ' , i . e . , are required t o be 
objective in expressing t h e i r opinion any communication which 
i s discrepant with t h e i r ex i s t ing opinion w i l l , of course, 
arouse cognit ive dissonance; when they are 'ego-involved' , 
i . e . , are required t o express t h e i r personal opinion based 
on t h e i r own l ik ing or d i s l i k e , without a reference t o any 
external c r i t e r i o n or standard, any communication which appears 
t o be discrepant with t h e i r ex i s t i ng opinion f a i l s t o arouse 
cognitive dissonance. 
Taking a lead from t h i s conclusion, one may propose t o 
study, the effect of 'cognit ive dissonance' upon opinion 
change in a r i sk- tak ing s i tua t ion such as gambling in which 
the Ss are expected to be ' t a sk -o r i en ted ' in so fa r as they 
are required t o be objective in t h e i r choice of r i sk a l t e rna t i ve s 
each r i sk a l t e rna t ive being based on coinmunication indicat ing 
probabi l i ty of success and amount of payoff. 
As i t has been s ta ted e a r l i e r , cognit ive dissonance i s 
an unpleasant s t a t e of tension and an individual experiencing 
i t is motivated t o reduce i t . Cognitive dissonance may be 
reduced in dif ferent ways. As Alpert and Haber (I960) have 
s ta ted , there are two general kinds of resjxsnses which an 
individual may make to s t r e s s f u l s i t u a t i o n s : (a) f a c i l i t a t i v e 
or adaptive response, and (b) d e b i l i t a t i v e or maladaptive 
response. An individual experiencing cognitive dissonance. 
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which i s also a s t a t e fu l l of s t r e s s , may respond to i t in 
one of these two ways in order t o reduce tension, with the 
source of dissonance being removed by the f a c i l i t a t i v e 
response involving adjustments and necessary modifications 
but being only glossed over by the d e b i l i t a t i v e one involving 
some kind of defense mechanism. Since these tv/o types of 
iresponses'are c losely bound up with the global personal i ty 
dimension-called adjustment-maladjustment, the f a c i l i t a t i v e 
response being used by a well-adjusted individual while the 
d e b i l i t a t i v e one being used by a maladjusted individual , the 
question of whether the individual wi l l make t h i s or t h a t 
type of response in a s i tua t ion involving cognit ive 
dissonance understandably depends upon such personal i ty 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the individual as are related t o adjustment-
maladjustment. 
There are recurrent observations in l i t e r a t u r e , and in 
some cases empirical findings also, to suggest t ha t , there are 
among others , four most important personal i ty var iab les which 
play a v i t a l role in the adjustment-maladjustment of an 
individual , namely, anxiety, self-esteem, in te rna l -ex te rna l 
locus of control , and repress ion-sens i t i za t ion . 
The personal i ty var iab le cal led anxiety refers t o the 
d i spos i t ion which is character ized by a r e l a t i ve ly pervasive 
s t a t e of emotional tension, i . e . , a r e l a t i v e l y constant 
apprehension and feel ing of incompetence and helplessness 
(Cattel and scheier, 1961; Spielberger, 1966, 1972). The 
emotional tension charac ter iz ing anxiety plays an important 
role in an ind iv idua l ' s adjustment to his environment. At 
low levels of anxiety the individual i s a l e r t and v i g i l e n t so 
t ha t he i s equipped for e f fec t ive act ion, while a t high 
leve ls his behaviour gets disorganized and he loses his 
a b i l i t y for effect ive action (Basowitz e t a l . , 1955). I t has 
been reported tha t people with a high level of anxiety tend 
t o be r ig id and inf lexib le in t h e i r approach t o a problem 
(Cowen, 1952 a,1952b; Jones, 1954; Longenecker, 1962). 
Individuals who are a f f l i c t ed with intense feel ings of 
anxiety tend t o behave in an ego-defensive manner p a r t i c u l a r l y 
in a s i tua t ion which i s uncomfortable and s t r e s s f u l . Once 
they make a response however inappropriate and inadequate i t 
may be they pe r s i s t in making tha t response as they feel tha t not 
to do so would amount t o admitting t h e i r inadequacy. They are 
more concerned with a l l ev i a t i ng t h e i r anxiety by defensive 
methods than with solving t h e i r problem in a r e a l i s t i c manner. 
Handler and sarason (1952) consider anxiety t o be the source 
of se l f -or iented and t a sk - i r r e l evan t responses which tend t o 
in te r fe re with task-re levant responses and thus make an 
individual maladaptive in his behaviour. Sarason (1957), on 
the bas i s of experimental evidence suggesting tha t Ss obtaining 
high scores on anxiety d i f f e r from other Ss in t h e i r behaviour 
under condit ions of s t r e s s , makes the inference tha t when faced 
with a s t r e s s fu l s i tua t ion an anxiety-ridden Ss performance 
w i l l be disrupted on account of his i n a b i l i t y t o cope with the 
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requirements of the s i t u a t i o n . According to Sarason, Ss 
with high anxiety would be emit t ing in te r fe r ing t a sk -
i r r e l evan t responses t o a greater extent than do other Ss 
in the anxiety score d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
The personal i ty var iab le of self-esteem refers t o an 
ind iv idua l ' s perception of h is worth as measured by the 
extent t o which his perception of his r ea l - se l f approximates 
his perception of his idea l - se l f , the assumption being tha t , 
the smaller the difference between the perception of the r ea l -
sel f and tha t of the i dea l - s e l f the grea ter i s the worth of 
the r ea l - s e l f and the higher i s the self-esteem, and vice 
ve r sa . High-low self-esteem may thus be conceptualized as 
se l f -eva lua t ion in terras of an idea l . If an individual 
perceives himself to be measuring upto his ideal , he tends to 
perceive himself as being l ikab le , worthy, and competent 
(Cohen, 1959; Combs and snygg, 1959). If, on the other hand, 
he perceives himself t o be f a l l i n g short of h is i l ea l , he tends 
t o perceive himself as being unl ikable , unworthy, and 
incompetent (Fitch, 1970). 
Evaluation of self in terms of an idea l - se l f cons t i tu t e s 
an ind iv idua l ' s self-concept which plays a dynamic role in 
his capacity t o cope with the l i f e s i t u a t i o n s . The individual , 
in his ac t ions , t r i e s t o be cons is tent with how he perceives 
himself in re la t ion to his i dea l - se l f . If his self-esteem 
is ' high and he perceives himself t o be worthy, l i kab l e , and 
competent e t c . , t h i s i s bound to influence his behaviour and 
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action in so far as he w i l l tend t o exert himself t o l ive 
upto these self-perceived cfualities and thus achieve b e t t e r 
adjustment in l i f e . There i s a large body of empirical 
s tudies which can be c i t ed in support of these formulations 
(Byrne, 1961; Chase, 1957; Hilson and Worchel, 1957; Moses 
and Duvall, I960; Rogers and Dymond, 1954). 
The personali ty var iab le of i n t e rna l - ex t e rna l locus of 
cont ro l , which has evolved out of the soc ia l learning theoiry 
of Rotter (1954), refers to t t e extent t o which an individual 
feels tha t he himself has and does not have control over, and 
consequently is and i s not responsible for, the outcome of 
his behaviour. At one extreme end of t h i s dimension are 
' i n t e rna l ly -o r i en t ed ' individuals who bel ieve that 
reinforcements are contingent upon t h e i r own act ions and hence 
are under t h e i r own control ,whi le a t the other extreme end 
are ' ex te rna l ly -or ien ted ' individuals who bel ieve tha t they 
do not have control over the outcome of t h e i r ac t ion . 
Individuals who are ' i n t e r n a l l y - o r i e n t e d ' , as compared t o 
those who are ' ex t e rna l ly -o r i en ted ' , perceive themselves, as 
DuCette, Wolk, and Soucar (1972) have pointed out, as personally 
responsible for the outcome of t h e i r act ion, and such persons 
understandably tend to be more adaptive, capable of u t i l i z i n g 
feedbacks from t h e i r environment, and, hence able t o adjust 
themselves ef fec t ively with the demands of l i f e . This is not 
only a t heo re t i ca l formulation but has been bom out by 
empirical s tud ie s . One of such s tudies has, for example, 
demonstratec' tha t individuals , who are ' i n t e r n a l l y - o r i e n t e d ' . 
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in contras t to those who are ' ex t e rna l ly -o r i en ted ' , are less 
apt to demonstrate non-adaptive behaviour (Du Cette and 
Wo±k, 1972). 
Prom what has been said above i t i s reasonable to conclude 
tha t ' i n t e rna l ly -o r i en t ed ' individuals are more adjusted than 
'exfeernally-oriented' ones. 
The personal i ty var iable designated as repression-
sens i t i za t ion refers to a b ipo la r categor izat ion t o c lass i fy 
individuals with respect t o two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c modes of 
defensive responses to threa tening s t imul i (Byrne, 1961). At 
one extreme of the dimension are repressors , i . e . , individuals 
who c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y employ avoidance, denia l , and 
repression of po ten t i a l t h rea t and conf l ic t as the primary 
mode of coping with anxiety, while at the other extreme are 
s e n s i t i z e r s , i . e . , individuals who predominantly employ such 
defense mechanisms as I n t e l l e c tua l i z a t i on , approach, and 
obsession-compulsion t o cope with anxiety, when f i r s t 
proposed by Byrne (1961) the two modes of defensive responses 
were conceived as a sign of maladjustment. That i s , individuals 
who are at the extremes on the repress ion-sens i t iza t ion were 
considered t o be equally maladjusted but u t i l i z i n g dif ferent 
defense mechanisms. However, a number of s tud ies have 
reported a l inear re la t ionsh ip between t h i s dimension and 
adjustment as measured by paper-pencil t e s t s , with repressors 
showing b e t t e r adjustment than s e n s i t i z e r s (Byrne, 1961; 
Lacky and Grigg, 1964; Joy, 1963; Byrne, Golightly, and 
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Sheffield, 1965; Byrne, Barry, and Nelson, 1963). A l i n e a r 
re la t ionship between the personal i ty dimension of repress ion-
sens i t izat ion and adjustment has also been reported in s tudies 
which ident i f ied adjustment-maladjustment on the bas i s of 
c l i n i c a l diagnosis . Feder (1967) and Tempone and Larrib (1967) 
have reported tha t the defensive s ty le of repression occurred 
with s ign i f i can t ly higher frequency in the adjusted population, 
whereas the defensive s ty le of s ens i t i za t ion occurred with 
s ign i f i can t ly grea ter frequency in the maladjusted population 
of c l i n i c a l and psychia t r ic p a t i e n t s . Besides these s tudies 
inquir ing into the re la t ionsh ip between repress ion-sens i t izat ion 
and adjustment^ in problem solving s i t ua t i ons a lso repressors 
have been reported t o be more adaptive. Cohen and Foerst (1968) 
reported, in an experiment, tha t repressors developed 
appropriate problem-solving systems more quickly and u t i l i z e d 
t h e i r systems more e f f i c i en t ly , as compared t o s e n s i t i z e r s . 
That there is a l i nea r re la t ionsh ip as bom out by 
empirical evidence, and not a cu rv i l inea r re la t ionsh ip as 
Byrne (1961) would have us bel ieve , between repress ion-
sen s i t iza t ion and adjustment-maladjustment i s explicable in 
terms of one important a b i l i t y d i f f e r en t i a t i ng between 
repressors and s e n s i t i z e r s , namely, the a b i l i t y t o control 
emotions. Ijsfcourt (1966) found a l i nea r r e l a t ionsh ip 
between repress ion-sens i t iza t ion and ' a f f e c t - i d e a t i o n ' , by 
which he means project ion of emotions,with s e n s i t i z e r s 
project ino greater amount of emotions than repressors in 
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describing TAT f igures . I t i s quite reasonable to bel ieve tha t 
individuals who are capable of con t ro l l ing t h e i r emotions 
can exercise s e l f - r e s t r a i n t b e t t e r than those who are swayed 
by t h e i r emotions and with s e l f - r e s t r a i n t one can deal with 
s i t ua t ion and people more adequately. Emotional control and 
se l f - i ies t ra in t are thus among the m.ost important components of 
adjustment. 
The above discussion of the four personal i ty va r iab les , 
namely, anxiety, self-esteem, in te rna l -ex te rna l locus of 
control , and repress ion-sens i t i za t ion c l e a r l y suggests t h a t , 
in a s i tua t ion involving cognit ive dissonance, those who are 
highly anxious, have low self-esteem, are ex terna l ly-or iented 
in t h e i r a t t i t udes towards locus of control , or are 
s e n s i t i z e r s wi l l resor t to reducing cognitive dissonance by 
making d e b i l i t a t i v e type of responses which are defensive and 
maladaptive in nature, while those who are mildly anxious, 
have high self-esteem, are in te rna l ly -or ien ted in t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e s towards locus of cont ro l , or are repressors w i l l 
reduce cognitive dissonance by making f a c i l i t a t i v e type of 
responses which are adaptive in na tu re . 
c h a p t e r I I 
SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
Theire a re two main a s p e c t s of t h e problem: (1) t h e 
paradigm o r the method by which c o g n i t i v e d i s sonance can b e 
aroused beyond any doiibt; and (2) t h e r e l evance of r i s k -
t a k i n g s i t u a t i o n t o s tudy t h e e f f e c t of c o g n i t i v e d i s sonance 
upon opinion change. The p resen t c h a p t e r i s in tended t o 
examine, in t h e l i g h t of p rev ious s t u d i e s , t h e s e a s p e c t s of 
t h e problem in two d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s . 
F e s t i n g e r ' s (1957) t h e o r y of c o g n i t i v e d i s sonance , as 
mentioned in Chapter I , has provided a b a s i s fo r a l a r g e 
number of s t u d i e s u s i n g v a r i e d paradigms, l i k e c o u n t e r -
a t t i t u d i n a l behav iour , p o s t - d e c i s i o n change, and d i s c r e p a n t -
communication. In many of t h e s e s t u d i e s , t h e ques t ion whether 
c o g n i t i v e d issonance was aroused o r not by employing one of 
t h e s e above paradigms has been c o n t r o v e r s i a l . This con t rove r sy 
may be gleaned th rough t h e s t u d i e s employing d i f f e r e n t 
paradigms o r methods t o produce c o g n i t i v e d i s sonance , namely. 
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the method of coun te ra t t i tud ina l behaviour, the method of 
post-decision change and the method of discrepant-communication, 
The method of coun te ra t t i tud ina l behaviour requires the 
individual to engage himself in an a c t i v i t y which i s a t 
variance with some be l i e f held by him. 
Fest inger (1957) considers tha t engaging in a 
coun te ra t t i t ud ina l behaviour leads t o the arousal of cognitive 
dissonance because of the existence of two inconsis tent 
cognit ions, namely, the cognition about the overt behaviour, 
v i z . , " I did one th ing , " and the cognition about one 's own 
bel ief , v i z . , " I bel ieve the opposite t o what I d id ." To be 
more exp l i c i t , when an individual has done something which i s 
not consis tent with his own be l i e f he experiences two 
inconsis tent cognit ions, namely, one cognition of what he 
has done and another of what he ac tua l ly be l i eves . The 
existence of these two inconsistent cogni t ions, i t i s claimed, 
leads to the arousal of cognitive dissonance. To ireduce 
t h i s cognit ive dissonance, the individual modifies his 
a t t i t ude in the d i rec t ion of the posi t ion represented by the 
coun te ra t t i t ud ina l behaviour in order t o make his a t t i t ude 
consis tent with what he had ovetly done. 
To specify the necessary condit ions for the arousal of 
cognitive dissonance by engaging in the coun te ra t t i tud ina l 
behaviour, Fest inger (1957) mentions the ' insuf f ic ien t 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n hypothesis ' according to which cognit ive 
dissonance w i l l be aroused to the extent t o which the 
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individual engages in the coun te ra t t i t ud ina l act without 
suf f ic ient j u s t i f i c a t i o n or reason, l i k e pressures, t h r e a t s , 
and rewards to make him engage in tha t act , as any j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
in these forms cons t i tu t e s a cognition which i s consonant 
with the cognition of engaging in tha t a c t . Thus, the s t ronger 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for engaging in a coun te ra t t i tud ina l act , 
the l e s s e r would be the cognitive dissonance between what 
one does and what he be l ieves , and, conversely the weaker 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for engaging in t ha t ac t , the greater would 
be the cognit ive dissonance. 
The above posi t ion was tes ted in the c l a s s i c experiment 
carr ied out by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). In t h i s 
experiment, the Ss were enticed t o t e l l a waiting S (actual ly 
a confederate) t ha t the experimental task, which they had 
known on the bas i s of t h e i r own experience as dul l and boring, 
was i n t e r e s t i n g . The Ss were to ld by the experimenter t ha t 
his a s s i s t an t who usual ly performed t h i s job of t e l l i n g the S 
about the i n t e r e s t i n g nature of the task which was in fact 
du l l and boring had unexpectedly fa i led to show up, that they 
would be offered sane money t o perform t h i s job of his 
a s s i s t an t , and tha t they would possibly be cal led again to 
do the same job on payment in future a l s o . HsuLf of the ss 
were offered $ 20 and the remaining half of them $ 1 for 
engaging themselves in the coun te ra t t i t ud ina l task of t e l l i n g 
the waiting s about the i n t e r e s t i ng nature of the experimental 
task which ac tua l ly was du l l and bor ing . I t was found t h a t 
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the Ss who had been offered $ 1 for performing the counter-
a t t i t u d i n a l task showed greater a t t i t u d e change in the d i rec t ion 
of the posi t ion they had publicly advocated than did; the Ss who 
had been offered $ 20 for performing the same t a sk . The finding 
of th i s experiment provided a c l ea r evidence in support of the 
' i n su f f i c i en t j u s t i f i c a t i o n hypo thes i s ' . In t h i s experiment, 
those Ss who were subjected to grea te r amount of pressure, 
i . e . , were offered higher reward for doing something against 
t h e i r b e l i e f tended to have experienced cognit ive dissonance 
to a l e s s e r degree than those Ss who were subjected to l e s s e r 
amount of pressure, i . e . , were offered smaller reward and, 
thus were amenable to greater amount of a t t i t u d e change, as 
they had insufficient j u s t i f i c a t i o n for doing the task or 
suff ic ient grounds ( j u s t i f i ca t i on ) for experiencing cognit ive 
dissonance. 
Pest inger and Carlsmith 's f inding was not, however, 
acceptable to everyone. some, l ike Rosenberg (1965) pointed 
out a procedural flaw in the methodology of the experiment 
carr ied out by them, namely, tha t since the experimenter 
himself was the source of pressure (offering large or small 
incentive ) as well as evaluator of possible change in the 
a t t i t udes of the Ss, there was a p o s s i b i l i t y of there being 
less change in the a t t i t udes of those who were exposed to 
greater amount of pressure than those who were exposed to 
l e s se r pressure not because the former had greater j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for doing the coun te ra t t i t ud ina l task and, consequently. 
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l e s se r j u s t i f i c a t i o n for cognit ive dissonance than the 
l a t t e r , but because both types of Ss, those exposed t o greater 
pressure and those exposed t o l e s se r pressure t r y to appear 
consis tent to the experimenter by put t ing up res is tance t o a 
change in t h e i r a t t i t u d e in proportion t o the amount of 
pressure . Thus, in the opinion of Rosenberg (1965), the 
finding of Fest inger and Carlsmith (1959) was mainly due to 
t h e i r fa i lu re t o control the effect of what he ca l led 'evaluation 
apprehension' by which he meant 'an act ive anxiety-toned 
concern (to) win a pos i t ive evaluation from the experimenter* 
(Rosenberg, 1965, p .29) . His asser t ion i s t ha t i f two 
experimenters were used,one t o induce the s to engage in the 
coun te ra t t i tud ina l act and the other t o t e s t the possible change 
in the S's a t t i t u d e af te r the occurrence of the counter-
a t t i t u d i n a l act , thereby removing the effect of 'evaluation 
apprehension', then they would have been j u s t i f i e d in i n t e r -
pre t ing the r e su l t s in the way they did, i . e . , in terms of 
cognit ive dissonance. 
Rosenberg (1965) has not only suggested the correct 
methodological procedure but has himself performed an experiment 
s imi lar to tha t of Fest inger and Carlsmith by following what 
he thought to be the correct proceduire, i . e . , by using tv70 
experimenters, one t o induce the S t o engage in the counter-
a t t i t u d i n a l aet and the o ther to t e s t the possible effect of 
the coun te ra t t i t ud ina l act on a t t i t ude change. His experiment 
yielded r e su l t s which were at variance with r e su l t s reported 
by Fest inger and Carlsmith. Thus, Rosenberg's asser t ion i s . 
20 
and i t i s based on experimental evidence, tha t counter-
a t t i t u d i n a l act does not produce cognit ive dissonance. 
The conf l ic t between the findings of the experiments 
car r r ied out by Festinger and Carlsmith and by Rosenberg 
stimulated many inves t iga tors t o repeat these experiments with 
a view t o resolving the c o n f l i c t . The most i n t r igu ing outcome 
of the experimental endeavours of these inves t iga tors was t h a t 
many of them reported findings confirming the findings obtained 
by Fest inger and Carlsmith and by Rosenberg. Thus, the 
conf l ic t in the o r ig ina l findings could not be resolved, and 
as Coll ins and BDyt (1972) pointed out, i t could be resolved 
only by sc ru t in i z ing the specif ic condit ions under which the 
sxibsequent experiments for the ve r i f i ca t i on of the findings 
of the o r ig ina l experiments were conducted. 
A close examination of these confirmatory experiments 
shows t h a t the experimental conditions varied from experiment 
to experiment. For instance, there were d i f ferent types 
of coun te ra t t i t ud ina l act , and t o perform the coun te ra t t i t ud ina l 
act was in some experiments obl igatory (with no-choice) while 
in others i t was voluntary (with cho ice) . Carlsmith, Coll ins 
and Ifelmreich (1966) reported two experiments in one of which 
the coun te ra t t i t ud ina l act required the Ss to describe a boring 
task as in t e re s t ing , while in the other the Ss were required 
to wri te a coun te ra t t i tud ina l essay. The f i r s t experiment 
confirmee? the resuJ.ts of Festinger and Carlsmith 's experiment, 
whereas, the second one confirm.ed the r e su l t s of Rosenberg's 
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experiment. In one set of experiments (Linder, Cooper and 
Jones, 1967; Holmes and Strickland, 1970; Sherman, 1970), 
which used the coun te ra t t i t ud ina l act requiring to write a 
coun te ra t i i t ud ina l essay, half of the ss were given a chance t o 
make a choice e i t h e r to serve or not to serve as Ss in the 
experiment, and no such chance was given to the remaining 
half of the s s . The in t e re s t ing findings of these experiments 
were t ha t the r e su l t s under the f i r s t condition were consis tent 
with the findings of Festinger and Carlsmith, whereas, the 
r e su l t s under the second condition were in l ine with the 
findings of Rosenberg. 
The r e su l t s of these experiments indicate that types of 
coun te ra t t i t ud ina l act , and 'choice ' v s . 'no-choice ' t o 
perform the coun te ra t t i tud ina l act are mainly responsible for 
the conf l i c t ing r e su l t s , i . e . , g rea te r monetary incentives 
bringing about greater change in a t t i t u d e and vice versa 
(showing a d i rec t re la t ionsh ip between incentive and a t t i t u d e 
change) in some condit ions, and g rea te r monetary incent ives 
bringing about l e s se r change in a t t i t u d e and vice versa 
(showing an inverse re la t ionsh ip between incentive and 
a t t i t ude change) in some other condi t ions . 
The inverse re la t ionship between incentive and a t t i t ude 
change in the condition of descr ibing a boring task as i n t e r e s t i n g , 
an act which i s not only unpleasant but a lso de f in i t e ly taxing 
in so fa r as i t requires the Ss to t e l l a l i e , may be explained 
in terms of insuff ic ient j u s t i f i c a t i o n hypothesis which holds 
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tha t when a coun te ra t t i tud ina l act i s perfoirmed with a g rea te r 
amount of incentive (suff ic ient j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) the incentive 
i s perceived as a pressure, and consequently, the act produces 
l e s se r change in the a t t i t u d e , but when i t i s performed with a 
less amount of of incentive ( insuf f ic ien t j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) the 
incentive i s not perceived as a pressure, and consequently, 
the act tends t o produce greater change in the a t t i t u d e . The 
d i rec t r e la t ionsh ip between incentive and a t t i t u d e change in the 
condition of wri t ing an essay in support of something against 
one 's own conviction, a task which though not a pleasant one i s 
d e f i n i t e l y not undesirable and taxing as i t merely requires the 
Ss t o engage themselves in some sor t of an i n t e l l e c t u a l exercise , 
on the o ther hand, seems t o be expl icable in simple terms of 
reinforcement, i . e . , since the t ask i s somewhat i n t e r e s t i ng 
the incentive works as a reward and not as a pressure so t h a t the 
grea te r amount of incentive works as a grea ter amount of reward 
producing grea ter amount of change in the a t t i t u d e , and the l e s s e r 
araotint of incentive, as a l e s se r amount of reward producing 
lesse r amount of change in the a t t i t u d e . When a choice i s 
given t o engage or not t o engage in t h i s kind of act the 
re la t ionsh ip between incentive and a t t i t u d e change i s , again, 
reversed, i . e . , the greater the amount of incentive the 
l e s se r the a t t i t u d e change, and vice versa . This might well 
be due t o the fact tha t when the Ss perfoirm the act out of 
t h e i r free wi l l a new psychological factor comes into operation 
namely, the "need for freedom*, This need i n t e r ac t s 
inversely with the incentive t o determine the a t t i t u d e change. 
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in the same way In which under the condition of descr ibing a 
boring t ask as in te res t ing the incentive becomes a j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for doing an undesirable task, and hence, works as a pressure, 
with the resu l t tha t a greater amount of incentive works as 
a g rea te r amount of pressure and, consequently, the need for 
freedom aroused by choosing t o perform the act bu i lds up a 
greater amount of res is tance t o a t t i t u d e change, and conversely, 
a l e s s e r amount of incentive works as a l e s s e r amount of 
pressure which, in turn, reduces the amount of res i s tance to 
a t t i t ude change. 
From what has been said abouve one can draw cer1:ain 
conclusions which are as fol lows. If the re i s a pos i t ive 
re la t ionsh ip between a t t i t ude change and incentive or, in other 
words, if an a t t i t ude i s changed as a r e su l t of incent ive, 
i . e . , reinforcement, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o explain t h i s change in 
terms of cognitive dissonance, t h i s being so when one wr i tes , 
under compulsion, an essay in support of something which is 
against one 's own convict ion. If, however, there i s an 
inverse re la t ionsh ip between a t t i t u d e change and incentive 
or reinforcement, i . e . , if high incentive r e su l t s in l e s s e r 
a t t i t u d e change while low incent ive r e su l t s in grea ter a t t i t ude 
change, t h i s change cannot be explained in terms of 
reinforcement, and one i s j u s t i f i e d in assuming tha t i t is due 
prim.arily to the intervening condition ca l led cogni t ive 
dissonance which is created by doing something against one 's 
o\m conviction (coun te ra t t i tud ina l a c t ) . 
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Thus, the a t t i t ude change under the f i r s t condition, 
namely, describing a boring task as in t e re s t ing ( t e l l i n g a 
l i e ) under compulsion and the l a s t condit ion, namely, wri t ing 
an essay vo lun ta r i ly in support of something which is against 
one 's own conviction cannot be explained in terms of 
reinforcement, as an incentive ac ts as a pressure and is 
r e s i s t ed against , so tha t a change in the a t t i tude is 
minimized. In these two condit ions when the incentive i s low 
or when there is no ' su f f i c i en t j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' the maximization 
of a t t i t u d e change may well be regarded as a d i rec t outcome 
of cognit ive dissonance created by a conf l ic t between what one 
be l ieves and what one does. 
To sum up, and th i s applies to the f i r s t and the l a s t 
condit ion, wten there is a low incentive or no ' su f f i c i en t 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' for doing something against one 's own conviction, 
the absence of any pressure in the form of incentive leaves 
one in r e l a t ive freedom to be exposed to the effect of the 
coun te ra t t i t ud ina l act in the form of cognitive dissonance 
produced by a cleavage between one 's a t t i t ude and one 's act , 
and t h i s cleavage i s reduced with a minimum or no res is tance by 
an appropriate change in the a t t i t u d e . 
Apart from using coun te ra t t i t ud ina l act as a method for 
indue into cognitive dissonance, another im.portant method used 
for t h i s purpose i s to require the s t o make a decision in a 
task involving a l t e rna t ive choices . Festinger (1957) s t a t e s 
tha t coonit ive dissonance is aroused a f te r a decision has been 
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made in favour of an a l t e r n a t i v e . His underlying assunption 
i s tha t the cognitive dissonance would occur when the decision 
in favour of the chosen a l t e rna t ive is contrary to the be l i e f s 
which favour the unchosen a l t e r n a t i v e s . It i s argued that 
a f t e r an individual has taken a decision in favour of one of 
the two a l t e rna t ives , he i s confronted with the real , i ty of 
ce r t a in undesirable behavioural consequence?, i . e . , the decision 
may stand in his way of enjoying the benef i t s of des i rable 
features of unchosen a l t e rna t ive and may force him to suffer the 
consequences associated with the undesirable features of the 
chosen a l t e r n a t i v e . The two unpleasant experiences follow 
inevi tab ly from any decision as both the chosen and unchosen 
a l t e rna t i ve s have pos i t ive as well as negative features (c.f . 
Gerard, 1967). The cognition of unfavourable aspects of the 
chosen a l t e rna t ive and the cognition of favourable aspects of 
the rejected a l t e rna t ive are dissonant with the cognition of 
the ac tual choice made by the individual with a view to 
a t t a in ing maximum benefi t from the decis ion. To reduce the 
cognit ive dissonance tha t inevi tably a r i ses from his decision, 
the individual tends t o s t a b i l i z e or freeze the decision by 
changing his cognitions of the a l t e rna t ives in such a way 
tha t the re la t ive a t t r ac t iveness of the chosen as connpared t o 
the unchosen a l t e rna t ive and the r e l a t ive una t t rac t iveness of 
the unchosen as compared to the chosen a l t e rna t ive are 
enhanced. The individual , thus, tends to increase the l ik ing 
of the chosen a l t e rna t ive and concomitantly decrease the l i k ing 
of the unchosen a l t e r n a t i v e . Through t h i s change in the 
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cognit ions of the two a l t e r n a t i v e s , the individual i s able t o 
j u s t i f y his decision and thus minimize the regre t associated 
with the reject ion of the des i rable features of the unchosen 
a l t e rna t i ve and the acceptance of the undesirable features of 
the chosen a l t e r n a t i v e . A number of s tud ies (Brehm and 
Cohen, 1962, p . 303; Pest inger, 1964) have supported the 
above pos i t ion , m a t yp i ca l experiment, the Ss are f i r s t 
i?equired t o ra te two a l t e rna t i ve s in terms of degrees of 
l i k ing , and then they are required t o make a choice between 
the two, a f t e r which they are required to rate them again in 
terms of degrees of l i k i n g . The finding of t h i s experiment i s 
tha t there i s an increase in the l ik ing of the chosen 
a l t e rna t ive and a decrease in the l ik ing of the unchosen one. 
An important question tha t has been raised in t h i s context 
by a group of inves t iga tors (Gerard, Blevans, and Malcolm, 1964) 
i s whether the increase in the re la t ive l i k ing of the chosen 
as compared to the unchosen a l t e rna t ive is due t o the arousal 
of cognitive dissonance o r to something e l s e . These 
inves t iga tors raised the doiobt t h a t i t i s due t o cognit ive 
dissonance implied in the act of choosing one of the two 
a l t e rna t i ve s , which i s aroused by a conf l ic t between the cognition 
tha t chosen a l t e rna t ive is desirable and the unchosen one i s 
undesirable on the one hand, and the cognition of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
tha t some features of the chosen a l t e rna t ive might be 
unfavourable on the o ther . They suspected tha t the increase 
in the l ik ing of the chosen a l te rna t ive and a decrease in the 
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l ik ing of the unchosen one might be due t o confirmation, on 
the part of the s, of what they designated as h is ' s e l f - a b i l i t y 
e s t i m a t e ' . What they meant by ' s e l f - a b i l i t y es t imate ' i s the 
tendency t o evaluate pos i t ive ly one 's own a b i l i t y to make a 
choice . According t o these inves t iga tors , the decision of the 
individual tends t o confirm his awareness about his a b i l i t y to 
weigh the r e l a t i ve value of the a l t e rna t ives and make a sound 
choice. They hypothesized tha t in those Ss who have a pos i t ive 
self -evaluat ion t h i s tendency w i l l be s t ronger than in those 
Ss who have a negative se l f -eva lua t ion . They also hypothesized 
tha t , the more d i f f i c u l t or the more important the decision, 
the more pronounced t h i s tendency would be, as under these 
condit ions, the a b i l i t y to make a choice would be put t o a more 
s t r ingen t t e s t . In order to ver i fy the f i r s t hypothesis, 
these inves t iga tors ca r r ied out an experiment in which the ss 
were devided into three groups, one designated as superior, 
one as average, and the th i rd one as i n f e r i o r in t h e i r a b i l i t y 
to make a judgment. All the Ss of the th ree groups were 
required t o express t h e i r judgement regarding the a r t i s t i c 
qual i ty of a s e r i e s of designs. Subsequently, the Ss of the 
' super ior ' group were to ld t ha t t h e i r judgment was superior 
t o tha t of others , the ss in the 'average' group were t o l d tha t 
t h e i r judgment was as good as tha t of o thers , while the ss in 
the ' i n f e r i o r ' group were to ld tha t t h e i r judgment was i n f e r io r 
to that of the o the r s . In t h i s way, the ss in the th ree 
groups were experimentally led to bel ieve t h a t they had high, 
average, anc^. low ability, respect ively to make a sound judgment 
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regarding the des igns . The ss of the three groups were presented 
with two paint ings one by one and they were required t o ra te the 
qual i ty of each of them on a ra t ing sca le , then they were asked 
t o choose between the two, and were then again asked t o rate 
the qual i ty of each of them on the same ra t ing s c a l e . With t h i s 
before-and-af ter design, the experiment showed tha t the tendency 
t o overrate the qua l i ty of the preferred pa in t ing and t o 
underrate the qua l i ty of the unpreferred paint ing was present 
in a l l the three groups, but t h a t t h i s tendency was highest 
in the ' super io r ' group, followed by the 'average ' group and 
was lowest in the ' i n f e r i o r ' group. Thus, the findings of the 
experiment confirmed the hypothesis, namely, tha t those who 
consider themselves t o be superior in t h e i r a b i l i t y t o judge, 
o r have a ' pos i t ive se l f -eva lua t ion ' manifest t h i s tendency in 
grea ter degree than those who consider themselves t o be average 
in t h i s a b i l i t y , and s imi lar ly , those who consider themselves 
t o be average manifest t h i s tendency in grea te r degree than 
those who consider themselves t o be i n f e r io r , o r have a 
•negative s e l f - e v a l u a t i o n ' . 
To put i t in more plain terms, once the Ss make a choice 
between two a l t e rna t i ve s , the ' supe r io r ' Ss who have a ' pos i t ive 
se l f -eva lua t ion ' tend to overrate the preferred a l t e rna t ive and 
to underrate the nonpreferred one in g rea t e r degree than do 
the ' i n f e r i o r ' Ss who have a 'negative s e l f - e v a l u a t i o n ' . 
In order t o ver i fy the second hypothesis, namely, the more 
d i f f i c u l t and the more important the decis ion, the more 
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pronounced the tendency to increase the l ik ing of the chosen 
a l t e rna t ive and to decrease the l ik ing of the unchosen one 
would be, the d i f f i c u l t y and the importance of the decision 
were induced in the experiment. For half of the ss the choice 
was made a ' d i f f i c u l t ' one by making the two paint ings 
presented to them close in value, while for the remaining 
half of the Ss the choice was made an 'easy ' one by making the 
two paintings d i spara te in va lue . Again, for half of the ss 
making e i t h e r a ' d i f f i c u l t ' choice or an ' easy ' choice the 
importance of tJie decision was made high while for the 
remaining half i t was made low. The 'h igh ' importance of the 
decision was induced by t e l l i n g the S tha t he would be given 
a very good and large p r in t of the paint ing he chose, and the 
' low' importance of the decision, by t e l l i n g the s tha t he was 
merely required t o s t a t e a preference between the two paintings. 
The r e su l t s of the experiment showed tha t the tendency to 
increase the l ik ing of the chosen a l t e rna t i ve and t o decrease 
the l ik ing of the unchosen one was highest in the case of 
those Ss for whom the choice was d i f f i c u l t as well as was of 
'h igh ' importance, and was lowest in the case of those Ss for 
whom the choice was easy as well as was of ' low' impoartance. 
Thus, the hypothesis was confirmed. 
From the findings of the above experiment, i t seems ireasonable 
to conclude tha t the tendency to increase the l ik ing of the 
chosen a l t e rna t ive and t o decrease the l i k i n g of the unchosen 
one as a resu l t ot a choice making i s b e t t e r explained in terms 
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of 'confirmation of s e l f - a b i l i t y es t imate ' r a the r than in 
terms of the arousal of cognitive dissonance, and hence, 
the doubt that the tendency might not be due t o the arousal 
of cognitive dissonance is strengthened. One important 
led 
inference which one i s inevi tably^to draw from t h i s conclusion 
and which has a d i rec t bearing upon the procedure to be 
adopted for the study of our problem, i s tha t the method which 
requires the s to make a decision in a task involving 
a l t e rna t i ve choices i s not a proper method for inducing 
cognitive dissonance. 
Another important method tha t has been employed to induce 
cognitive dissonance i s one in which an individual is provided 
with a discrepant information, i . e . , an information which is 
contrary t o the opinion he holds . Fest inger (1957) says t ha t , 
an individual experiences cognitive dissonance when he 
receives an information which i s contrary t o the opinion he 
holds . The cognitions t ha t ' I hold an opinion' and tha t ' I 
come across an information which is contrary t o the opinion 
I hold' are dissonant with each o ther . To reduce the cognitive 
dissonance, the individual wil l e i t h e r change his own opinion 
or change ( i . e . , d i s t o r t ) the discrepant information. If, 
hov/ever, the discrepant information i s so au thor i t a t ive or 
convincing tha t one cannot do without accepting i t , one wi l l 
tend to reduce the cognitive dissonance by modifying one 's 
own opinion in such a way tha t i t would appear cons is ten t 
with the information received. 
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In a typ ica l experiment using t h i s method, the s i s 
f i r s t required t o express his opinion, and then, he is provided 
with an information which is discirepant with the opinion he 
holds, a f t e r which he i s again required t o express his 
opinion. A number of experiments have been performed with 
t h i s procedure in order t o study the effect of discrepant 
information upon opinion change, but the findings are 
conf l i c t ing (Derlega, 1972; Zimbardo, i960) . 
In the l igh t of these conf l ic t ing f indings, a number of 
questions may be ra ised: (a) what i s a discrepant infoirmation? 
(b) Does a discrepant information necessar i ly arouse cognitive 
dissonance; if not, under what condition w i l l a discrepant 
information arouse cognit ive dissonance? Regarding the f i r s t 
question, . i t i s important t o note the observation made by 
Kiesler , Coll ins, and Mil ler (1969), t h a t the concept of 
discrepancy as used in several experiments i s insuf f i c ien t ly 
defined. As the concept of discrepancy i s not c l e a r l y defined, 
there may be s i t ua t i ons in which what i s considred to be a 
discrepant information by the experimenter may not be cognized 
as such by the S. 
With regard t o the second question, several inves t iga tors , 
l ike Derlega (1972) and Zimbardo (I960) consiser involvement 
in the cognitive elements t o be an important var iab le which 
affects the magnitude of cognitive dissonance. However, the 
question of involvement in the cognit ive elements, as pointed 
out by Kiesler , Col l ins , and Mil ler (1969), has not been c l ea r ly 
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defined in terms of the antecedent condit ions tha t produce i t or 
the manner in which i t may vary in both degree and type . In fac t , 
d i f ferent experimental procedures have been used in order t o 
induce involvement so tha t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o say which one of 
the va r i e ty of experimental procedures i s more appropr ia te . Then, 
in several experiments in which discrepancy and involvement are 
considered t o have been induced in order t o arouse cognit ive 
dissonance, i t i s doubtful whether cognit ive dissonance has 
ac tua l ly been aroused. 
In order to resolve the above mentioned doubt, one has to 
keep in mind what Pest inger (1957) has s t a ted , tha t i f two 
cognitive elements are dissonant with one another the magnitude 
of the cognitive dissonance would be a function of the importance 
of these cognitive elements. What Fest inger meant seems to be 
t ha t the experience of cognitive dissonance by an individual 
depends upon t t e importance of both the opinion held by him and 
the information presented to him as discrepant with the opinion 
he holds, and when e i t h e r of the tvro elements f a i l s to be 
important to the individual cognit ive dissonance w i l l not be 
experienced by him. 
Empirical data suggest tha t a c ruc i a l condition in which 
both the opinion an individual holds and t t e information presented 
to him as discrepant with his opinion w i l l be important i s the 
nature of the involvement the individual has in the s i tua t ion , 
i . e . , the question of whether he i s 'ego-involved' or ' t a sk -
involved* in the s i t u a t i o n . If the individual i s 'ego-invooved' 
in the s i tua t ion , i . e . , i s mainly concerned with expressing an 
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opinion re f l ec t ing his own personal l i ke s and d i s l i k e s , he w i l l 
surely consider the opinion he holds as something important, and 
wi l l tend to consider any information which i s contrary t o the 
opinion he holds as scxnething unimportant, and consequently, w i l l 
be l e a s t suscept ible t o experiencing any cognit ive dissonance. If, 
on the other hand, the individual i s ' task- involved ' in the 
s i tua t ion , i . e . , isi mainly concerned with giving an opinion not 
r e f l ec t ing his own personal l i ke s and d i s l i k e s but d i rec ted towards 
solving a problem, he wi l l surely consider the opinion he holds as 
something important, and also w i l l not consider any information 
which i s contrary t o the opinion he holds as something unimportant. 
That i s , when an individual i s in a s i tua t ion in which he i s ' t a s k -
involved' , he w i l l tend t o consider both the opinion he holds and 
the information t h a t i s communicated to him as discrepant with the 
opinion he holds t o be important, and w i l l , thus , tend t o experience 
cognitive dissonance. In br ief , we can say tha t in the condition of 
'ego-involvement' the chances of arousal of cognit ive dissonance 
and, consequently, of any opinion change in favour of the 
discrepant information would be low, whereas, in the condition 
of ' task-involvement ' the chances of arousal of cognitive 
dissonance and, consequently, of an opinion change in favour of 
the discrepant information would be high. 
What has been s ta ted above has ac tua l ly been empir ical ly 
demonstrated in two experiments, one car r ied out by Derlega (1972) 
and the other, by Zimbardo (I960). The two experiments which used 
a before-and-af ter paradigm in which the Ss were f i r s t required to 
give t h e i r opinions on an issue, and then were exposed t o a 
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discrepant information a f t e r which they were again required t o 
give t h e i r opinions on the issue, studied the effect of discrepant 
information upon opinion change by employing a two in to two 
f ac to r i a l design in which two l eve l s regarding the degrees of 
discrepancy of the discrepant information and two leve ls regarding 
the degrees of involvement of the ss were experimentally induced. 
In both the experiments/ half of the Ss were required t o express 
t h e i r opinions under high degree of involvement which was induced 
by t e l l i n g them tha t t h e i r opinions would re f lec t t h e i r 
personal i ty , and the remaining half of the Ss, under low degree 
of involvement which was induced by t e l l i n g them tha t t h e i r 
opinions on the issue had nothing to do with t h e i r pe rsona l i ty . 
Further, in both the experiments for half of the ss who expressed 
t h e i r opinions under e i t h e r high degree of involvement or low degree 
of involvement the degree of discrepancy between t h e i r opinions 
and the discrepant information communicated t o them was high, and 
for the remaining half of the Ss i t was low. The two experiments, 
though they employed iden t i ca l experimental designs and procedures, 
differed in one c r u c i a l respect , namely, in the nature of the 
opinions the Ss were required t o express . The ss in Derlega 's 
experiment were required to express ' ego-or iented ' opinions, ' i . e . , 
t h e i r own opinions based on t h e i r personal l ik ing as to t t e number 
of hours one should spend in watching t e l e v i s i o n . The Ss in 
Zimbardo's experiment, on the other hand, were required to express 
' t a sk -o r i en ted ' judgements, i . e . , t h e i r unbiased and object ive 
assessment regarding the locus of blame in a case study of a 
juvenile del inquent . Thus, the opinions tha t the Ss in the former 
experiment were required t o express had a personal frame of 
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reference involving one 's own i n t e r e s t s , a t t i t u d e s , and preferences, 
whereas the opinions tha t the Ss in the l a t e r experiment ware 
required to express had an ex te rna l ly defined frame of reference 
involving ac tua l facts responsible for making an adolescent a 
del inquent . As the purpose of both the experiments was to study 
the effect of the degree of the respect ive type of involvement, 
•ego-involvement' in one case and ' task-involvement ' in the other , 
upon opinion change, the ss in each experiment were devided in to 
two groups of equal number, one serving as an experimental and 
the other as a control group. In the ss of the experimental group 
in each experiment, the degree of involvement was experimentally 
enhanced in the manner s ta ted e a r l i e r . The experiment of Derlega 
revealed tha t the ss who expressed t h e i r opinions under enhanced 
'ego-involvement' showed l e s s e r amount of opinion change than did 
the ss who expressed t h e i r opinions under normal 'ego-involvement' , 
whereas the experiment of zimbardo revealed that the ss who 
expressed t h e i r opinions under enhanced ' task-involvement' showed 
grea ter amount of opinion change than did the ss who expressed 
t h e i r opinions under normal ' task- involvement ' . The Ss in Derlega 's 
experim.ent, as they are ba s i ca l l y 'ego-involved' in t h e i r opinions 
are presumably more prone to r e s i s t any information tha t appears 
to be contrary t o t h e i r own personal opinions, thereby experiencing 
l e s s cognit ive dissonance and a l so showing l e s s amount of opinion 
change as compared t o those who are ' task- involved ' in t h e i r 
oponions. This tendency to disregard and re jec t any discrepant 
information as i r r e levan t and unacceptable i s , understandably, 
further increased when the 'ego-involvement' of the Ss i s enhanced. 
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In con t ras t , the Ss in Zimbardo's experiment, as they are 
ba s i ca l l y ' task-involved* in t h e i r opinions, are more receptive 
t o an information which i s not cons is tent with t h e i r judgmental 
opinions, and consequently, experience greater amount of 
cognit ive dissonance and also show grea ter amount of opinion 
change as compared t o those who are 'ego-involved' in t h e i r 
opinions. This tendency to consider a discrepant information as 
relevant and worth-accepting in fur ther increased when the ' t a sk -
involvement' of the Ss i s enhanced. 
On the bas i s of the above review one can make ce r t a in broad 
formulations regarding the condit ions leading t o the arousal of 
cognitive dissonance and the methods and procedures by which these 
condit ions maybe produced. Pest inger (1957) o r ig ina l l y conceived 
cognit ive dissonance as a psychological phenomenon which i s 
aroused when an individual comes across a cognition of something 
which i s inconsis tent with the opinion he holds, e i t h e r by 
engaging in an act which cont rad ic ts h is opinion or by being 
provided with an information which i s incompatible with t ha t 
opinion. The experimental evidence furnished by the s tudies 
reviewed here, however, seem to lay down cer ta in condit ions for 
the occurrence of t h i s phenomenon. 
One important condition for the arousal of cognit ive 
dissonance i s tha t the Individual should be l e f t free t o engage 
in the coun te ra t t i t ud ina l a c t . In o ther words, i f the individual 
himself does not choose to engage in the coun te ra t t i tud ina l act 
but engages in the act without his choice, the chances are tha t 
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he would not experience any cognitive dissonance. 
Another important condition for the arousal of cognit ive 
dissonance i s that the opinion the individual i s required t o 
express should involve some kind of judgment with an ex terna l 
and objective frame of reference ( ' t a s k - o r i e n t a t i o n ' ) ratl ier 
than his own preference based on his personal and subject ive 
scale of l i k ing or d i s l i k e ( ' e g o - o r i e n t a t i o n ' ) , when t t e 
individual i s ' t a sk -o r i en t ed ' , i . e . , i s recfuiired to express 
an opinion involving a judgpnent, he i s l i ke ly t o be receptive 
to any information which i s inconsis tent with h is ' judgnent-
based-opinion ' , and consequently experience cognit ive dissonance 
On the other hand, when the individual i s ' ego-or ien ted ' , i . e . , 
i s required to express an opinion based on h is own preference, 
he i s l i k e l y to disregard or r e s i s t any information which i s 
contrary to his 'preference-based-opinion' as i r r e l evan t , and 
w i l l consequently not experience cognit ive dissonance. 
Of the two methods used for the arousal of cognit ive 
dissonance one t o engage the s in a coun te ra t t i t ud ina l act 
and the other to expose him to a contradic tory information 
communicated t o him verba l ly the l a t t e r i s simpler and more 
convenient than the former. This i s so because in the method 
using verbal communication of contradictory information the 
inconsistency between the opinion the individual holds and the 
information that i s communicated to him i s more e a s i l y and 
prec ise ly d iscern ib le not only by the s but also by the 
experimente r . 
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m view of the above general izat ion, the technique of 
inducing cognit ive dissonance used in the present study cons i s t s 
of f i r s t requiring the s t o eaqpress a judgement-based o r ' t a s k -
or ien ted ' opinion and then exposing him to a verbal coromvmication 
of an information which cont rad ic t s h is opinion. 
There has been a large amount of researches on r i sk- tak ing 
behaviour. Broadly speaking, these researches are mainly of 
two types, one dealing with individual differences in r i sk -
taking behaviour, and the other , with the ef fec t of s i t u a t i o n a l 
fac tors on r i sk- tak ing behaviour. The f i r s t type of researches 
have dea l t with the question of a general r i sk - t ak ing t r a i t 
upon which individuals d i f f e r , o r with the problem of re la t ionsh ip 
of r i sk - tak ing behaviour with personal i ty v a r i a b l e s . The 
importance of the question of consistency in an i nd iv idua l ' s 
inc l ina t ion for r i sk across s i t ua t ions has been emphasized by 
Kogan and Wallach (1967) in t h e i r extensive review of the 
r i sk- tak ing l i t e r a t u r e . The f i r s t study deal ing with t h i s 
question was reported by s lovic (1962). He argued tha t the 
existence of a r i sk - tak ing d ispos i t ion would be es tabl ished if 
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dif ferent measures of r i sk- tak ing behaviour demonstrated what 
Campbell and Fiske (1959) c a l l convergent v a l i d i t y . Administering 
a b a t t e r y of nine d i f ferent measures of r i sk - t ak ing behaviour 
on a sample of eighty-two Ss, Slovic attempted t o find out 
co r re la t ions among di f ferent measures of r i sk - t ak ing . The 
findings did not e s t ab l i sh the existence of a general r i sk -
taking d i spos i t i on . Kogan and Wallach (1964), who adopted 
S lov ic ' s procedures, also arr ived a t the same conclusion. The 
fa i lu re t o find a t r a n s s i t u a t i o n a l genera l i ty in r i sk - tak ing has 
been reported by several o ther inves t iga to rs (Brichacek, 
1968; Flanders, 1970; Goodman, 1970; Greene, 1963, 1964> 
Hei l izer and Cutter , 1971; Highbee, 1971; Johnson, 1963; 
Slovic, 1972; Weinstein, 1969; Weinstein and Martin, 1969). 
On the bas i s of the findings of these s tud ies one i s e a s i l y 
led t o conclude t h a t empirical evidence argues against the 
existence of r i sk - tak ing propensity as a generalized 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of individuals , and s i t u a t i o n a l determinants 
seem much more important than organismic ones. 
As pointed out above, the question of individual differences 
in r i sk- tak ing behaviour in terms of i t s r e l a t ionsh ip with 
personal i ty var iab les a lso received a t t en t i on of several 
i nves t iga to r s . The bulk of research deal ing with t h i s question 
has been generated by the Atkinson's r i sk - t ak ing model (1957). 
This model explains r i sk- tak ing on the b a s i s of j o in t action 
of two motives, namely, motiveto approach success and motive 
to avoid f a i l u r e . I t p red ic t s tha t individuals in whom the 
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foimer motive i s s tronger than the l a t e r one prefer intermediate 
r i sks , while those in whom the l a t e r one is s t ronger prefer 
e i t h e r very high r i sks or very lov; r i s k s . The bas i s for 
t h i s model came from the re la t ionsh ip tha t McClelland (195 5) 
obtained between need for achievement and preference for 
a l t e rna t ives having moderate p robab i l i t i e s of success in r ing 
toss , l eve l of asp i ra t ion , and vocation choice. Several 
s tudies have confirmed the predict ions of the model. For 
example, Litwin (1958) found that Ss with a high need for 
achievement and a low need for avoiding fa i lu re preferred 
intermediate r isks s ign i f i can t ly more often than did ss with 
a low need for achievement and a high need for avoiding fa i lu re 
in a game of chance. Atkinson et a l . (1960) a lso got s imi la r 
resu l t s in a study using a shuffle board game which involves 
s k i l l and a be t preference task which involves chance. Scodel, 
Ratoosh and Minas (1959) related achievement motivation to 
r i sk - tak ing behaviour. m t h e i r study, r i sk- tak ing behaviour 
was measured by the probabi l i ty preferences in the choice of 
be t s in a rea l gambling t a sk . They found tha t Ss with a 
'high need for achievement' tended to prefer bets with 
' in termedia te ' p robab i l i t i e s of success (1/4, 1/3, 1/2), while 
Ss with a 'low need for achievement' tended to prefer bets with 
'extreme' p robab i l i t i e s of success (1/36, 1/18, 1/9, 3 /4) . Using 
a task involving outcomes of chance, Hancock and Teevan (1964) 
conducted a study to determine re la t ionsh ip between achievement 
motivation and r i sk- tak ing behaviour. They found tha t Ss with 
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'high motive to avoid f a i l u r e ' chose r isk a l t e rna t ives with 
low p r o b a b i l i t i e s of success (1/6, 2/6) in the i n i t i a l t r i a l , 
while Ss with 'high motive to approach success ' chose r i sk 
a l t e rna t ives having high p robab i l i t i e s of success (4/6, 5 /6 ) . 
Although these s tudies lend support to the predict ions 
of the Atkinson's r i sk- tak ing model, several o ther inves t iga to r s 
in t h i s area found tha t support t o these predic t ions were 
subject to cer ta in s i t ua t i ona l condi t ions . L i t t i g (1959) 
reported tha t Ss with a high motive to avoid fa i lu re preferred 
bets having 'extreme' p robab i l i t i e s of outcome in a game of 
chance, but , contrary t o the predict ion of the model, Ss with a 
high motive to approach success did not prefer be t s having 
' in te rmedia te ' p robab i l i t i e s of outcome to ones having 
'extreme' p r o b a b i l i t i e s . The inves t iga tor explained the 
l a t t e r finding by suggesting tha t a chance s i tua t ion did not 
arouse achievement motivation in Ss with a high motive to 
approach success. Raynor and smith (1966),using two types of 
r i sk - tak ing s i tua t ion , one involving s k i l l and the o ther 
involving chance, and two types of o r ien ta t ion condit ion, 
namely 'achievement-oriented' condit ion and ' re laxed ' condit ion, 
studied the re la t ionship of achievement-related motives to 
r i sk- tak ing behaviour. They found re la t ionsh ip between 
achievement motive and preference for intermediate r i sks in 
a s i tua t ion involving s k i l l but not in a s i tua t ion involving 
chance, and t h i s re la t ionship was found to be s t ronger under 
'achievement-oriented' conditions than under ' re laxed ' 
condi t ions . 
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I t i s , now, quite evident tha t the r e su l t s ind ica t ing 
re l a t ionsh ip of achievement motive to r i sk - tak ing behaviour 
are cons i s ten t ly obtained when the r isk s i tua t ions involve 
s k i l l , and inconsistent when the r i sk s i tua t ions involve 
chance. Several inves t iga tors (Kogan and Wallach, 1967; 
Slovic, 1964) arrived a t the same conclusion in t h e i r 
respect ive review of the r i sk- tak ing research. 
A host of s tudies have attempted t o r e l a t e r i sk - tak ing 
behaviour with other personal i ty va r i ab l e s . For example, 
Liverant and Scodel (1960) related preference of r i sk level 
to scores on a t e s t designed t o assess the personal i ty 
dimension of in te rna l -ex te rna l locus of con t ro l . Their 
findings showed tha t Ss with external locus of contix>l 
preferred extreme r i sks as compared to Ss with in te rna l locus 
of con t ro l . HDwever, Str ickland e t a l . (1966), in a study, 
obtained resu l t s which were opposite to the finding of 
Liverant and Scodel. In a subsequent study. Baron (1968) 
a lso studied the re la t ionsh ip between the r i sk- tak ing 
behaviour and scores on a sca le measuring in te rna l -ex te rna l 
locus of con t ro l . The co r re l a t ions obtained were quite low 
in absolute terms, thereby leading the inves t iga to r to conclude 
tha t the personal i ty dimension of in t e rna l -ex te rna l locus of 
control i s of l i t t l e importance in predic t ing r i sk - t ak ing 
behaviour. 
U t i l i ze r and Cutter (1971) made a comprehensive study of 
personali ty cor re la tes of r i sk- taking behaviour by using 
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personal i ty var iables for which there is some expectation of 
relevance to r i sk - t ak ing . The personal i ty var iab les were 
t e s t anxiety, extroversion and neuroticism,and i n t e r n a l -
external locus of cont ro l , which were measured by Handler 
Sarason Test Anxiety Questionnaire, Eysenck Personal i ty 
Inventory, and Rot te r ' s Scale of In ternal-External Locus of 
Control respect ively . Also included were five more personal i ty 
va r iab les , namely psychopathic deviate, anxiety, soc ia l 
d e s i r a b i l i t y , dominance, and control which were measured by 
the MMPI sca les . The t heo re t i ca l r a t i ona l which Hsi l izer and 
Cutter used for hypothesizing personal i ty co r re l a t e s of r i sk-
taking was with reference to the Americanized version of the 
Protestant Ethics and the Good person: good adjustment (low 
on t e s t anxiety, neuroticism, anxiety, and con t ro l ; high 
on soc ia l d e s i r a b i l i t y ) , good impulse control (low on 
extraversion and psychopathic deviate) a be l i e f in one^^s own 
effect iveness (low in externa l locus of con t ro l ) , and asser t ive 
(high on dominance). 
The invest igat ion was carr ied out on two samples of Ss — 
one 'primary sample' comprising one hundred and for ty-four 
SS and one ' r ep l i ca t ion sample' comprising f i f ty - four Ss. The 
• repl ica t ion sample' was included to ver i fy the r e su l t s tha t 
were obtained from the 'prim.ary sample' . The r i sk - t ak ing task 
was presented in an open and complete format in which the Ss 
could eas i ly expect the r isk a l t e rna t ives to be presented to 
them. However, the procedures tha t were used in the experiment 
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with the ' r ep l i ca t i on sample' appeared to have added uncer ta in ty 
and complexity in the r i sk- tak ing s i t u a t i o n . The r e su l t s 
showed l i n e a r re la t ionships between r i sk- tak ing and cer ta in 
personal i ty va r i ab l e s . However, the re la t ionsh ips tha t were 
obtained were of modest magnitude, and a t the same time, the 
confirmation from the rep l ica t ion sample of the r e su l t s obtained 
from the primary sample i s inadequate. While discussing t h e i r 
f indings, Bfeilizer and Cutter pointed out tha t the data 
presented the appearance of f rag i le personal i ty co r r e l a t e s of 
r i sk- tak ing , e a s i l y d iss ipa ted by incidenta l va r i a t ions in 
sampling or induction. In t h e i r opinion, i t i s possible t ha t 
the added uncer ta inty and complexity of the r i sk- tak ing 
s i tua t ions of the rep l ica t ion sample were responsible to 
annihi la te the f ragi le re la t ionships observed in the primary 
sample. 
The most important point tha t can be made out from the 
findings of Hfeilizer and Cutter i s the importance of s i t u a t i o n a l 
factors in the r i sk - tak ing behaviour. 
The foregoing discussion shows tha t s tud ies of individual 
differences in r i sk- tak ing behaviour in terms of a general 
r i sk - t ak ing tendency have fai led to e s t ab l i sh r i sk - t ak ing as a 
general t r a i t or propensi ty. Similarly, researches car r ied 
out to study individual differences in r i sk - t ak ing behaviour 
on the bas i s of personal i ty co r re l a t e s of r i sk - t ak ing behaviour 
have also led to inconsis tent r e s u l t s . Rather, r e su l t s of 
several s tudies suggest the importance of s i t u a t i o n a l factors 
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in r i sk- tak ing behaviour. 
Several inves t iga tors have undertaken researches t o 
study the effect of s i t u a t i o n a l factors on r i sk - tak ing 
behaviour. An important s i t ua t i ona l factor the effect of 
which on r i sk- tak ing behaviour has been extensively studied 
i s group influence. Most of the researches ca r r i ed out on 
t h i s problem have used 'Kogan-Wallach choice dilemma problems' 
(Wallach and Kogan* 1959). The typica l paradigm in these 
researches i s as follows: The Ss are f i r s t required to 
express t h e i r choices of r isk leve ls on these 'choice dilemma 
problems'. In each problem, a person i s depicted as being 
in a dilemma to make a choice between two a l t e r n a t i v e s . One 
of the two a l t e rna t ives i s quite safe, and the other, though 
more desirable than the f i r s t , involves ce r t a in d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The S i s required to indicate the minimum odds or p robab i l i t i e s 
of success he would need before choosing the more desi rable 
a l t e r n a t i v e . After having served individual ly in the experiment 
a l l the ss are required to pa r t i c ipa te in a group discussion of 
these 'choice dilemma problems'. The Ss are again required, 
a f t e r the group discussion, to express t h e i r choices of r i sk -
levels on the same 'choice dilemma problems' . The f i r s t study 
to inves t iga te the effect of group influence upon r i sk- taking 
behaviour was done by stoner (1961). I t was found tha t 
individuals became r i s k i e r a f t e r the group inf luence. The 
finding a t t rac ted the a t ten t ion of a large number of inves t iga tors 
because i t v/as contrary t o the wel l -es tabl ished t r a d i t i o n , in 
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soc ia l psychology,of convergence phenomenon, i . e . , individuals 
in a soc ia l s i tua t ion avoid extireme opinions or judgments and 
the consensus represents an averaging or a compromise among 
individual pos i t i ons . The general expectation on the bas i s 
of convergence phenomenon was tha t individuals would converge 
towards moderate posi t ion in t h e i r choices of r isk levels 
under group influence. As s ta ted by P r u i t t (1971), a host of 
s tudies was undertaken to ver i fy Stoner ' s f inding. Most of 
the e a r l i e r s tudies confirmed the finding, with the r e su l t 
t ha t they were subsumed under the notion of ' r i sky shift* 
research signifying the study of the phenomenon of an 
ind iv idua l ' s becoming r i s k i e r a f t e r group inf luence. However, 
many l a t e r s tudies (Bli tz and Dansereau, 1972; Fraser, Gouge 
and B i l l i g , 1970; Rabow, Fowler, Bradford, Hofeller, and 
Shibuya, 1966; Stoner, 1968; Vidmar and Burdeny, 1969) 
reported r e su l t s indica t ing tha t an individual became more 
cautious a f t e r group influence. This l a t e r finding brought 
about a change in the trend of s tudies in which the e a r l i e r 
notion of ' r i sky s h i f t ' was replaced by a new one cal led 
'choice sh i f t on r i sk dimension' which covers both types of 
sh i f t , i . e . , the shif t towards grea ter r i sk ' and the sh i f t 
towards grea ter caut ion. Most of the sxobsequent s tudies 
di rected t h e i r a t tent ion towards providing an explanation of 
the phenomenon of 'choice shi f t on r i sk dimension'in general 
without considering the type of choice s h i f t . m t h e i r s tud ies , 
Rabow e t a l . (1966) and Stoner (1968) showed tha t , under group 
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influence an individual became r i s k i e r while solving ce r ta in 
'choice dilemma problems' and more cautious in case of other 
problems, indicat ing a p o s s i b i l i t y t ha t the proper t ies of 
the 'choice dilemma problem' are responsible for the type of 
•choice sh i f t on the r i sk dimension' which an individual 
shows under group inf luence. B l i t z and Dansereau (1972) 
recognized t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y and attempted t o ident i fy 
proper t ies of 'choice dilemma problems' which make an 
individual e i t he r r i s k i e r or more cautious under group 
inf luence. They successfully ident i f ied three such proper t i es , 
namely, (a) the importance of the consequences of the 
decision, (b) the control the individual has over the 
success o r the fa i lure of t he decision, and (c ) the effect 
of the decision on o the r s . This s t a t e of a f f a i r in the 
research dealing with the problem of r i sk - tak ing under group 
influence leads one to agree with Cecil (1972) who asse r t s 
t ha t more research i s needed to iden t i fy other s i t u a t i o n a l 
fac tors which may affect an ind iv idua l ' s r i sk - tak ing behaviour. 
Thus, instead of studying the effect of group influence upon 
r i sk - t ak ing behaviour, i t w i l l be worthwhile i f we d i r ec t 
our a t t en t ion to inves t iga te the effect of other s i t u a t i o n a l 
factors on r i sk- taking behaviour. 
Another s i t u a t i o n a l fac tor which has been extensively 
studied is the nature of the r i sk- tak ing s i tua t ion varied on 
the bas i s of whether i t involves s k i l l or i t involves chance. 
A r i sk - tak ing s i tua t ion involving s k i l l i s one in which the 
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outcomes are contingent upon s k i l l , whereas a r i sk - tak ing 
s i tua t ion involving chance i s one in which the outcomes are 
control led only by chance fac to r s . The two types of r i s k -
taking s i t ua t i ons may be said to d i f f e r along the dimension 
of cognitive cont ro l , i . e . , the feel ing of control an 
individual has over the outcome. A s k i l l r i sk - t ak ing s i t ua t ion 
involves maximum cognitive control and a chance r i sk- tak ing 
s i tua t ion , the l eas t cognitive con t ro l . 
several inves t iga tors (Cohen, 1960; t fei l izer and Cutter, 
1971; Kogan and Wallach, 1964; L i t t i g , 1962) have studied 
the difference between the s k i l l r i sk - t ak ing and the chance 
r i sk - t ak ing . These s tudies reported conf l i c t ing f indings . 
For example, Kogan and wallach reported that a s k i l l context 
produced moderate r i sk- tak ing and a chance context, extreme 
s t r a t e g i e s , i . e . , very high or very low r i sk- tak ing , while 
Heil izer and Cutter found no difference between the s k i l l r i s k -
taking and the chance r i sk - t ak ing . 
Another important s i t u a t i o n a l fac tor the effect of which 
has been studied i s the nature of r i sk - t ak ing s i tua t ion 
induced through the kinds of consequences — rea l or imaginary 
gain or loss — involved in i t . A r i sk- tak ing s i t ua t ion 
involving real gain or loss i s known as a ' r e a l r i sk- tak ing 
s i t u a t i o n ' , and a r i sk- taking s i t ua t i on involving imaginary 
gain or loss i s known as a 'hypothet ical r i sk - tak ing s i t u a t i o n ' , 
There has been a large number of s tud ies (Edwards, 1953; 
Hei l izer and Cutter, 1971; Slovic, 1969) dealing with the 
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question of difference bet\^;een a rea l r i sk- tak ing and a 
hypothetical r i sk - t ak ing . These s tudies reported conf l ic t ing 
f indings. Edwards reported tha t ' r e a l r i sk- tak ing s i tuat ion* 
produced more extreme r i sk- tak ing than did a 'hypothet ical 
r i sk- tak ing s i t u a t i o n . slovic reported tha t a ' r e a l r i s k -
taking s i t u a t i o n ' produced choices of more caution than did 
a 'hypothet ica l r i sk- tak ing s i t u a t i o n ' . Contrary to t h i s 
finding, Hei l izer and cu t t e r got r e su l t s ind ica t ing that a 
' r e a l r i sk - t ak ing s i t u a t i o n ' produced choices of grea ter r i sk 
than did a 'hypothet ical r i sk- tak ing s i t u a t i o n ' . 
The s tud ies which we have discussed so far are concerned 
with the question of s t a t i c r i sk- tak ing behaviour in which 
the Ss are required jus t to express t h e i r preferences of 
r i sk level from cer ta in r isk a l t e rna t ives signifying d i f fe ren t 
r i sk l e v e l s . There has been a number of s tudies dealing with 
the question of the effect of outcomes of previous r i sk 
preferences upon subsequent r i sk preferences, several 
inves t iga tors (Edwards, 1962; Slovic e t a l . , 1965; Lichtenstein, 
1965; Greenberg, and Vteiner, 1966) showed tha t choice of 
r i sk l eve l s was independent of actual amount of money won or 
l o s t . However, as reported by a number of inves t iga tors , the 
experience of win or loss has been found to affect the choice 
of r i sk l e v e l . Greenberg and Weiner (1966), for example, got 
r e su l t s ind ica t ing tha t the r e l a t i ve frequency of the 
experience of winning in re la t ion to the experience of los ing, 
i . e . , t he r a t i o of number of wins to number of losses , affected 
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the choice of r isk l eve l . They found t h a t the Ss who had 
experienced e i t h e r very high or very low r a t i o s of winnings 
showed preferences for high r isk , whereas the ss who had 
experienced both wins and losses in equal proportion showed 
preferences for low r i s k . Thus, they found a cu rv i l i nea r 
r e l a t ionsh ip between the proportion of the experience of 
wins and the preference for r i sk level .Contrary to t h i s finding. 
Mil ler , Meyer and lanze t ta (1969) reported d i r ec t re la t ionsh ip 
tha t 
between the two. In t h e i r study, they found/when the r a t i o 
of winnings increased the preference for r e l a t i v e l y more 
r isky a l t e rna t i ve s increased. The effect was not apparent 
in the beginning but became increas ingly marked in l a t e r par t 
of the experiment, which showed tha t the effect might be 
a t t r i bu ted t o the frequency of winnings which the Ss 
experienced in the course of t r i a l s . 
I t may be observed tha t these s tudies deal with the 
choice of r i sk level af ter the experience of d i f ferent r a t ios 
of wins to losses and not with the change in the choice of 
r isk a l t e rna t ive af te r the experience of winning or los ing . 
Kogan and Wallach (1964) reported a study inves t iga t ing the 
effect of the experience of outcome upon the change of r isk 
a l t e r n a t i v e . In t h e i r experiment, the S i s presented with a 
pa i r of two r i sk a l t e r n a t i v e s . His task is to se lec t one r isk 
a l t e rna t ive from the p a i r . When the s chooses r isk a l t e rna t ives 
in a se r ies of t r i a l s there i s an opportunity to study his 
sa t i s f ac t ion or d i s sa t i s fac t ion with the outcomes of the choices 
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of the previous t r i a l s . His choice in the sxibsequent t r i a l 
may re f l ec t his sa t i s fac t ion or d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the 
postdecis ional outcome of the choice of the pireceding t r i a l . 
Kogan and Wallach invest igated t h i s question in the context 
of Fes t inge r ' s (1957) theory of cognit ive dissonance. 
According to t h i s theory, an individual , who ccxnes across 
a cognit ion of something which i s discrepant with a cognition 
of holding a posi t ion, wi l l experience cognitive dissonance 
which i s an unpleasant s t a t e , and wil l tiry t o reduce i t 
e i t h e r by changing h is posi t ion or by d i s t o r t i n g the discrepant 
experience. Assuming tha t the choice of the same r i sk 
s t r a t egy or the change of the r i sk s t ra tegy an individual 
makes a f t e r the experience of postdecis ional outcome wi l l 
depend upon the mode of dissonance reduction he prefers , the 
Ss used in the experiment were varied on the personal i ty 
var iab les of t e s t anxiety and defensiveness. The expectation 
was tha t individuals varying on these personal i ty va r iab les 
may d i f f e r in t h e i r mode of dissonance reduction and thus in 
the tendency to choose the same r isk s t ra tegy or to change 
the r i sk s t ra tegy a f t e r the experience of postdecis ional 
outcome. The two inves t iga tors used five types of r i sk 
s t ra tegy , and the s ' s score on each s t ra tegy represented the 
number of times he selected the r i sk a l t e rna t ive keyed for 
the s t r a t egy in question in a l l appropriate p a i r s . A score 
indicates degree of adherence to a p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t egy . I t was 
found tha t Ss low in t e s t anxiety and defensiveness showed 
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fewer changes of r i sk s t r a t egy a f t e r winnings. On the other 
hand, ss high in t e s t anxiety and defensiveness were e i t h e r 
cons i s t en t ly risky or cons i s ten t ly cautious i r respec t ive of 
the nature of postdecis ional outcome. 
The study has got ce r ta in methodological l im i t a t i ons , 
which makes i t d i f f i c u l t t o accept the in t e rp re t a t ion of the 
r e su l t s given by the i n v e s t i g a t o r s . As the postdecis ional 
outcomes aire not experimentally induced, i t i s very d i f f i c u l t 
t o assess the effect of the nature of postdecis ional outcome 
upon the change of r isk a l t e r n a t i v e . Furthermore, the study 
f a i l s to control the ef fec t of r i sk leve l upon the change of 
r i sk a l t e rna t ive a f te r the experience of postdecis ional 
outcome. Further research i s , therefore , ca l led for t o 
c l a r i f y the uncer ta inty t ha t rem.ains. 
Summing up the sect ion, i t may be pointed out tha t in 
sp i t e of a large amount of researches on r i sk - tak ing behaviour 
there have been only a few s tudies dealing with the question 
of the effect of postdecis ional outcome upon r i sk - tak ing 
behaviour, and furthermore, these s tudies are concerned with 
the choice of r i sk level a f te r the experience of d i f fe ren t 
r a t i o s of winnings to los ings . There has been only one study 
(Kogan and Wallach, 1964), worth t o mention, in which the 
question of the chan^ of r i sk a l t e r n a t i v e a f te r the experience 
of a postdecisional outccame has been inves t iga ted . The tv/o 
inves t iga tors made t h e i r study on the bas i s of Fes t inger ' s 
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(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance which maintains that 
an individual who comes across an information which is 
discrepant with the opinion he holes w i l l experience cognitive 
dissonance which he wi l l t r y to reduce by changing his opinion. 
The study has got cer ta in methodological l imi t a t ions , which 
makes i t d i f f i c u l t to accept the r e s u l t s . Thus, i t i s 
per t inent to make some study in which these methodological 
l imi ta t ions are removed. 
Aim and Import;ance of the 
Present study 
As mentioned e a r l i e r , there has been a number of s tudies 
inves t iga t ing the effect of cognitive dissonance upon the change 
of opinion, by using di f ferent paradigms, namely, c o u n t e r a t t i -
tud ina l behaviour, choice between a l t e r n a t i v e s , and discrepant 
information. Studies using the method of discrepant information 
report conf l i c t ing findings; some report ing a greater opinion 
chcnge as the discrepancy betv/een the opinion an individual 
holes and the discrepant information given to him increases , 
ana some, a l e s s e r opinion change as the discrepancy inc reases . 
In the l i r h t of these conf l ic t ing findings i t i s reasonable 
to cisk v/hether a discrepcint information necessar i ly arouses 
cognitivu dissonance or ir. other words, in what condition a 
discrepant information v/ill arouse cognit ive dissonance. Several 
inves t iga tors (Derlega, 1972; Zirrtoardo, 19 60) consider 
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involvement in the cognit ive elements t o be an important 
var iab le which affects the magnitude of cognit ive dissonance. 
However, as Kies ler e t a l . (1969) have pointed out, the 
concept of involvement r e l a t ing t o the arousal of cognit ive 
dissonance has not been c l ea r ly defined in terms of antecedent 
conditions which produce i t , or the manner one can vary i t 
both in degree and tn type . 
With a\d.ew to c la r i fy ing the meaning of involvement as 
i t r e l a t e s t o the a iousal of cogni t ive dissonance, i t i s 
important t o note the observation made by Fest inger (1957), 
t h a t i f two cognit ive elements are dissonant with one another 
the magnitude of the cognit ive dissonance wi l l be a function 
of the importance of the cognit ive elements. What Fest inger 
has meant by t h i s observation seems t o be tha t cognit ive 
dissonance would be aroused in an indiv idual when both cogni t ive 
element, i . e . , the one implied in h is opinion t h a t has already 
been accepted by him and the o ther implied in the discrepant 
information t h a t i s being communicated now, are important from 
the point of view of the ind iv idua l . 
Empirical data obtained by Derlega (1972) and Zinibardo 
(I960) seem to suggest t ha t the importance of the two cognit ive 
elements i s contingent upon the type of involvement experienced 
by the individual in a given s i t u a t i o n . If the individual i s 
'ego-involved' with regard t o the opinion he i s expressing on 
a p a r t i c u l a r i ssue , i . e . , i s required t o express his own personal 
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b e l i e f s and values, the cognitive element of the opinion he 
holds w i l l ce r t a in ly assume importance for him but the 
cognitive element of any information which i s discrepant with 
the opinion he holds w i l l be i r r e l evan t and unimportant to 
him. If, on the other hand, the individual i s ' task- involved ' 
in expressing his opinion on an i ssue , i . e . , i s reouired to 
express a correc t and objective view regarding that i ssue , 
then both the cognitive eleirent of the opinion he i s holding, 
and tha t of any inform.ation tha t i s discrepant with the opinion 
he is holding wi l l be important to him. From what has been 
s tated above i t follows tha t cognit ive dissonance is l i k e l y 
to tie aroused only when the individual i s ' task- involved ' in 
express in c his opinion on an issue and not when he i s 'ego-
involved' in expressing his opinion. 
I t was in the context of the above conclusion tha t the 
present invest igat ion was undertaken with a view to studying 
the effect of cognitive dissonance upon opinion change in a 
guirbling type of r i sk- taking s i t ua t ion in v/hich the Ss, are 
expected t o be ' task-involved ' in so far as they are required 
to be object ive in t h e i r choice of r i sk a l t e rna t i ve s , each 
risk a l t e rna t ive being based on communication ind ica t ing 
probabi l i ty of success and amount of payoff. 
An inj,iortant factor which has not been taken in to account 
in e a r l i e r s tudies of cocr i t ive dissonance i s the role of 
indivir.'ucil differences in reducing cocni t ive dissonance. I t i s . 
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therefore , worthwhile to study how individual differences 
with respect to cer ta in personal i ty c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s affect the 
v/ays in which the individual reduces cognit ive dissonance. As 
pointed out in Chapter I, Alpert and Haber (1960) maintain tha t 
there are two general kinds of responses which an individual 
may make to s t r e s s fu l s i t u a t i o n s : (a) f a c i l i t a t i v e or 
adaptive response, and (b) d e b i l i t a t i v e or maladaptive 
response. An individual experiencing cognit ive dissonance, 
which i s also a s t a t e f u l l of s t r e s s , may respond to i t in one 
of these two ways in order to reduce tension, with the source 
of dissonance being removed by the f a c i l i t a t i v e response 
involving adjustments and necessary modifications but being 
only glossed over by d e b i l i t a t i v e one involving some kind of 
defence mechanism. Since these two types of responses are 
c lose ly bound up with the global personal i ty dimension ca l led 
adjustment-maladjustment, the f a c i l i t a t i v e response being used 
by a well-adjusted individual while the d e b i l i t a t i v e one being 
used by a maladjusted individual , the question of whether the 
individual wi l l make t h i s or tha t type of response in a 
s i tua t ion involving cognitive dissonance understandably depends 
upon such personal i ty c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the individual as are 
re la ted to adjustm.ent-maladjustraent. Recurrent observations 
in l i t e r a t u r e , and in some cases empirical findings suggest 
tha t ce r t a in personal i ty va r iab les , l i k e anxiety, i n t e r n a l -
external locus of control , self-esteem, and repression-
sens i t i z a t i on play a v i t a l ro le in the adjustment-maladjustment of 
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an ind iv idua l . 
As i t has been seen in the survey of l i t e r a t u r e on r i sk -
taking given in section (2), very scant a t t en t ion has been 
paid to study the effect of postdecis ional outcome upon r i s k -
taking behaviour. There has been only one study, i . e . , by 
Kogan and Wallach (1964) in which the question of change of 
r i sk a l t e rna t ive a f t e r the experience of a' postdecis ional 
outcone has been inves t igated. However, in t h i s study the 
postdecis ional outcomes are not experimentally induced, and 
thus i t i s very d i f f i cu l t to assess the effect of the nature of 
outcome upon the change of r i sk a l t e r n a t i v e . Further, the 
study f a i l s to control the effect of r i sk l eve l upon the change 
of r i sk a l t e rna t ive af ter the experience of a postdecis ional 
outcome. A change from a high r i sk a l t e rna t ive to a low r isk 
a l t e rna t ive a f t e r the experience of a postdecis ional outcome of 
losing and a change from a low r i sk a l t e rna t ive to a high r isk 
a l t e rna t i ve af ter the same type of experience are not equal . 
At the same time, a no-change from a high r i sk a l t e rna t ive to 
a low r i sk a l t e rna t ive a f te r the experience of a postdecis ional 
outcome of winning and a no-change from a low r i sk a l t e rna t i ve 
to a high r isk a l t e rna t ive a f t e r the same type of experience 
are not equal . In short , t o study the effect of postdecis ional 
outcor.e upon the change of r isk a l t e r n a t i v e i t i s necessary t o 
control the effect of r isk l e v e l . 
In the context of what have been discussed above, the present 
study wds undertaken with a view to ascer ta in ing experirr.entally 
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the ef fect of cognitive dissonance upon the r i sk- tak ing 
behaviour in re la t ion to each one of the four persona l i ty 
va r i ab le s , namely, anxiety, in t e rna l -ex te rna l locus of control 
self-esteem, and rep ress ion-sens i t i za t ion . Pour d i f ferent 
experiments each one using Ss who vary on one d i f ferent 
personal i ty var iable were performed. Since each one of the four 
personal i ty var iables i s considered to play a v i t a l role in 
the adjustment-maladjustment of an individual , the r e su l t s of 
one experiment wil l be var i f ied in the remaining three 
experiments. 
The present study attempts t o make an improvement over 
previous s tudies in so fa r as the arousal of cognit ive dissonsince 
in a r i sk- tak ing s i t ua t ion i s experimentally induced by giving 
the s a discrepant information of los ing the gamble and as the 
possible effect of r i sk level i s removed by makino the two 
r i sk a l t e rna t i ve s , presented to the s in a pai r , of the same 
r i sk l e v e l . 
The specif ic hypotheses t o be t es ted in the present study 
are as follows: 
1. In a risk-ta^<ing s i t ua t ion , there wi l l be a g rea te r 
tendency to chance r isk a l t e rna t ive a f te r arousal of cognit ive 
dissonance than a f te r nonarousal of cognit ive dissonance. 
2 . Under the condition of nonarousal of cognit ive dissonance 
both hiohly and mildly anxiors Ss wi l l be equally lackinc the 
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tendency to chance risk a l t e r n a t i v e , whereas under the condition 
of arousal of coonitive dissonance mildly anxious Ss wi l l show 
a g rea te r tendency to c h a n ^ r i sk a l t e rna t ive than do highly 
anxious Ss. 
3 . Under the condition of nonarousal of coonit ive dissonance 
both external ly-or iented and in te rna l ly -o r i en ted Ss w i l l be equally 
lacking the tendency to change r i sk a l t e rna t i ve , whereas under 
the condition of arousal of coonit ive dissonance i n t e r n a l l y -
oriented Ss wi l l show a g rea te r tendency t o change r isk 
a l t e rna t i ve than do external ly-or iented Ss. 
4. Under the condition of nonarousal of cognit ive dissonance 
both high self-esteeiti and low self-esteem Ss wi l l be equally 
lacking the tendency to change r isk a l t e rna t i ve , whereas under 
the condition of arousal of cognit ive dissonance high se l f -
esteem Ss wi l l show a grea ter tendency to change r i sk a l t e rna t ive 
than do low self-esteem Ss. 
5. Under the condition of nonarousal of cognit ive dissonance 
both repressor and s e n s i t i z e r Ss w i l l be equally lacking the 
tendency to change r isk a l t e r n a t i v e , whereas under the condition 
of arousal of cognitive dissonance repressor Ss w i l l show a 
grea te r tendency to chance r i sk a l t e rna t ive than do s e n s i t i z e r 
ss. 
C h a p t e r I I I 
METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
The p u r p o s e of t h e p r e s e n t s t u d y i s t o a s c e r t a i n 
e x p e r i m e n t a l l y t h e e f f e c t of c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e upon r i s k -
t a k i n g b e h a v i o u r i n r e l a t i o n t o f o u r p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e s . 
In o r d e r t o c l a r i f y t h e v a r i o u s v a r i a b l e s t h a t a r e i n v o l v e d 
i n t h e p r e s e n t e x p e r i m e n t , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o d e l i n e a t e them. 
I n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s 
The i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s i n v o l v e d a r e c o g n i t i v e 
d i s s o n a n c e , and f o u r p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e s , namely , a n x i e t y , 
i n t e r n a l - e x t e r n a l l o c u s o f c o n t r o l , r e p r e s s i o n - s e n s i t i z a t i o n , 
and s e l f - e s t e e m . T h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l d e f i n i t i s i o n s a r e g iven 
b e l o w : 
( i ) C o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e i s v a r i e d i n t o : ( a ) ' a r o u s a l o f 
c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e ' , and (b ) ' n o n a r o u s a l of c o g n i t i v e 
d i s s o n a n c e ' . ' A r o u s a l o f c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e ' i s i n d u c e d 
i n a gambl ing t y p e of r i s k - t a k i n g s i t u a t i o n b y g i v i n g t h e s 
' a n e g a t i v e f eedback of l o s i n g t h e g a m b l e ' , i . e . , b y d e c l a r i n g 
t h a t he h a s l o s t t h e gamble , and ' n o n a r o u s a l o f c o g n i t i v e 
d i s s o n a n c e ' b y g i v i n g t h e s a ' p o s i t i v e f eedback of w i n n i n g 
t h e gamble', i . e . , b y d e c l a r i n g t h a t he h a s won t h e g a m b l e . 
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( i i ) In order t o study the ef fec t of each one of the four 
persona l i ty var iab les upon opinion change in response t o 
cognit ive dissonance induced in a r i sk - tak ing s i t ua t i on , 400 
Ss are devided into four groups of 100 Ss each and the ss in 
each group are dichotomized in to two extreme groups, 'High* 
and 'Low', on the bas i s of t h e i r scores on the scale measuring 
each of the dif ferent pe rsona l i ty v a r i a b l e s . That i s , the Ss in 
the f i r s t group are dichotomized in to 'h ighly anxious' and 
•mildly anxious' Ss on the b a s i s of t h e i r scores on sinha W-A 
self-Analysis Form (1968), the Ss in the second group are 
dichotomized into ' ex te rna l ly -o r i en ted ' and ' i n t e r n a l l y -
o r i en ted ' Ss on the bas i s of t h e i r scores on Ro t t e r ' s I .E . 
Scale (1966), the Ss in the t h i r d group are dichotomized in to 
• s e n s i t i z e r ' and ' r ep ressor ' Ss on the b a s i s of t h e i r scores 
on Prasad 's Indian Adaptation of Byrne's Repression-
Sensi t iza t ion scale (1967), while the Ss in the fourth group 
are dichotomized in to 'low self-es teem' and 'high self-esteem' 
Ss on the bas i s of t h e i r scores derived from the difference 
between the ' r e a l s e l f and the ' i d e a l s e l f ra t ings for a 
nvuiiber of ad jec t ives . For dichotomization, P75 and P25 are 
used as cu t t ing po in t s . 
Dependent var iable 
The dependent var iable namely, r i sk - t ak ing behaviour i s 
opera t iona l ly defined as a change in the se lec t ion of one of 
two r i sk a l t e rna t ive choices in the second of two b ids as 
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compared t o the f i r s t one a f t e r winning ( 'nonarousal of 
cognit ive dissonance*) or los ing Carousa l of cogni t ive 
d issonance ' ) a gamble in a r i sk - t ak ing t a s k . A de ta i l ed 
account of the r i sk- tak ing t ask used in the present study 
i s givenbbelow: 
Risk-taking Task - The r i sk - tak ing task cons i s t s of a gaiiible 
in a guessing game involving solut ion of ten anagrams. The 
anagrams included in the gatte can be solved e a s i l y by any 
undergraduate student of average i n t e l l i g e n c e . Each anagram 
i s amenable t o two di f ferent solut ions of meaningful words. 
The S i s mainly required t o ganible in guessing which of t l ^ two 
solu t ions i s co r r ec t . Ha i s considered t o win the gamble 
i f he i s able to guess the correc t solut ions of a t l ea s t a 
specif ied number of anagrams which he intends t o guess 
c o r r e c t l y . 
The task i s spread over severa l t r i a l s , m each t r i a l s 
f i r s t , the s i s presented with a pa i r of two r i sk a l t e rna t i ve s 
from which he i s required to se lec t any one as a b id for the 
gamble. When he t r i e s the b id he i s given a feedback, e i t h e r 
a pos i t ive one of winning the gamble or a negative one of 
losing the gamble, a f te r which he i s presented with the same 
p a i r of the two r i sk a l t e r n a t i v e s for him to choose one r i sk 
a l t e r n a t i v e as a bid for the gamble a second t ime. 
A r i sk a l t e rna t ive i s expressed in terms of the chances 
of losing the gamble and the complementary chances of winning i t , 
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The r isk a l te rna t ive determines the number of anagrams the s 
i s required to guess co r rec t ly , in order to win the gamble, 
from a number of anagrams he i s allowed to t r y . For example, 
a r i sk a l t e rna t ive ind ica t ing 2/5 chances of los ing the gamble 
implies tha t the s wi l l be required to guess a t l e a s t two 
anagrams cor rec t ly in order to win the gamble from a t o t a l of 
five anagrams he i s allowed to t r y . Similarly, a r i sk 
a l t e rna t ive indicat ing 4/10 chances of lowing the gamble 
implies tha t the S wi l l be required to guess at l ea s t four 
anagrams correc t ly , in order to the gamble, from a t o t a l of ten 
anagrams he is allowed t o t r y . 
I t i s to be noted tha t e a r l i e r s tudies inves t iga t ing 
the effect of outcome upon the r i sk- tak ing behaviour (cf. 
Chapter I I ) fai led to control the effect of r i sk level upon 
the change of r isk a l t e r n a t i v e . Kogan and Wallach (1964) 
reported t h a t an experience of los ing a gamble with a r i sk 
a l t e rna t ive having higher r i sk leve l often led to a select ion 
of a r i sk a l t e rna t ive having lower r i sk level in a subsequent 
choice of r isk a l t e rna t ive , whereas the experience of los ing 
a gamble with a r isk a l t e rna t i ve having lower r i sk level seldom 
led t o a select ion of a r i sk a l t e rna t ive having higher r i sk l eve l 
in a subsequent choice of r i sk a l t e r n a t i v e . Along with, an 
experience of winning a gamble with a r i sk a l t e rna t i ve of low 
r i sk level often led to a change to a r isk a l t e rna t ive of high 
r i sk level in a subsequent choice of r i sk a l t e r n a t i v e , m t h i s 
context, i t i s considered necessary t o cont ro l the effect of 
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r i sk level upon the choice of r i sk a l t e rna t ive a f t e r the 
experience of winning or losing the garrible. 
Keeping t h i s in mind/ the two r isk a l t e rna t ives in a 
pa i r are made proport ionately equal in terms of the chances 
of los ing the gamble. For example, i f one r isk a l t e rna t ive 
in a pa i r has 2/10 chances of los ing the gamble, the other 
one wi l l have 1/5 chances of losing i t . Though the two r isk 
a l t e rna t ives in a pa i r are proport ionately equal in terms of 
the chances of los ing the gamble, they may be sa id to 
represent two di f ferent r i sk s t r a t e g i e s , the f i r s t one 
representing a 'wide r i s k - s t r a t e g y ' and the l a t e r one, a 
'narrow r i sk - s t r a t egy ' . 
According to several authors (Coaribs, 1967; Edwards, 
1962) the choice of a r i sk a l t e rna t ive i s affected by i t s 
expected value (EV), i . e . , by the sum of the product of the 
chances of winning and the amount to be won and the product 
of the chances of los ing and the amount to be l o s t . I t i s , 
therefore , considered necessary to equalize the EVs of two 
r i sk a l t e rna t ives in a p a i r by taking equal amounts to be 
won and equal amounts to be l o s t . The pa i rs of r i sk 
a l t e rna t ives used in the present experiment are given in 
Table A. In each t r i a l one of the three pa i r s w i l l be 
presented to an S in a random order, each p a i r of r i sk 
a l t e rna t ives being presented to him four times in a se r i e s of 
twelve t r i a l s . 
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TABLE A 
P a i r s of Risk A l t e r n a t i v e s Used i n t h e E x p e r i m e n t 
Pair 
1 
2 
3 
Alternative I 
Chances 
of 
Losing 
1/5 
2/5 
3/5 
Chances 
of 
Winning 
4/5 
3/5 
2/5 
Alternative II 
Chances Chances 
of of 
Losing Winning 
2/10 8/10 
4/10 6/10 
6/10 4/10 
Amount to be lost or to 
be won 
Amount to be 
lost (Rs.) 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
Amount to be 
won (Rs.) 
0.10 
0.15 
0.25 
Research Design 
Four dif ferent experiments were performed in order to 
determine the effect of cognit ive dissonance on r i sk - tak ing 
behaviour in re la t ion to each one of the four personality-
var iables separa te ly , with two values of cognit ive dissonance, 
•arousal ' and 'nonarousal ' , and two values of each one of the 
personal i ty var iab les , high and low a 2x2 f a c t o r i a l design of 
experiment was employed. 
Personal i ty Measures 
The four personal i ty var iab les , namely, anxiety, i n t e rna l -
external locus of cont ro l , r epress ing-sens i t i za t ion , and self-
esteem were measured by the sinha W-A Self-Anal ys i s Form (19 68), 
the Ro t t e r ' s I-E scale (1966), the Prasad 's Indian Adaptation 
of Byrne's R-S Scale (1967), and the se l f - Idea l -Se l f 
Discrepancy on a Trai t Adjectives Rating scale , respec t ive ly . 
Kach scale was t rans la ted from English to Hanipuri . In 
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t r a n s l a t i n g the scale a l l items were t r ans la ted l i t e r a l l y . 
Popular sayings whenever applicable were not used to avoid 
soc ia l d e s i r a b i l i t y . The pr inc ip le of t r ans l a t i on was 
comparable to that of Gough and Sandhu (1964) who t r ans la t ed 
the soc ia l iza t ion scale of California Personali ty Inventory 
for c ross-val ida t ion in India and tha t of Hsieh, Shybut and 
Lotsof (1969) who t rans la ted the Ro t t e r ' s I-E Scale in to 
Chinese. To t e s t the Manipuri t r ans l a t i on , three judges who 
knew both English and Manipuri were asked to t r a n s l a t e 
index^ndently the Manipuri version in to English. Their versions 
were very s imilar to each o ther and to the o r ig ina l English 
vers ion . The Manipuri version of the scale was administered 
t o 2 0 s tudents . Nearly th ree weeks l a t e r , they were given 
the English version of the scale in order t o determine the 
r e l i a b i l i t y of the t r ans la t ed version of the s ca l e . 
A b r i e f descript ion of the four personal i ty measures i s 
given below: 
(a) The Sinha W-A Self-Analysis Form (1968); I t cons is t s 
of one hundred questions, each provided with ' yes ' and 'no ' 
a l t e r n a t i v e responses. Each ' yes ' response i s scored one, and 
the 'no ' response. Zero. The t o t a l number of the ' ye s ' 
responses provides the anxiety score, with a high t o t a l score 
indica t ing low anxiety. Sinha ( 1961 ) has ireported tha t t h i s 
form cor re l a t e s 0.73 with the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale 
and has a s p l i t half r e l i a b i l i t y of 0.94. The Manipuri 
t r an s l a t i on of the form i s found to be corre la ted 0.84 with 
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the o r ig ina l English vers ion . 
^^^ The Ro t t e r ' s I-E Scale (1966); i t i s a widely used 
scale t o measure the personal i ty dimension of i n t e r n a l -
external locus of con t ro l . Throop and Macdonald (1971) 
consider i t t o be the bes t scale for measuring i n t e r n a l -
exteinial locus of control with adult population. I t has 29 
forced-choice items including 6 f i l l e r ones, in each of which 
the S i s required to make a choice between two a l t e r n a t i v e s , 
one indica t ing ex te rna l -o r ien ta t ion and the other, i n t e rna l 
o r i e n t a t i o n . Each choice of the a l t e rna t ive ind ica t ing 
ex te rna l -o r ien t at ion i s scored, and thus, a high t o t a l 
score indica tes ex te rna l -o r ien ta t ion while a low t o t a l score 
indicates i n t e rna l -o r i en t a t i on . The t r ans la t ed version i s 
found t o be corre la ted 0.87 with the o r ig ina l English vers ion . 
(*=) The Prasad's Indian Adaptation of Byrne's R-S Scale(1967 ); 
I t cons i s t s of 90 items in which 13 items are scored with ' f a l s e ' 
answer and the res t with ' t r u e ' answer, with a high t o t a l score 
ind ica t ing ' s ens i t i za t ion 'wh i l e a low t o t a l score ind ica t ing 
' r e p r e s s i o n ' . Prasad (in press) reported tha t the corrected 
s p l i t - h a l f r e l i a b i l i t y of the scale on a sample (N = 100) of 
Patna Universi ty s tudents i s 0.91 and coeff ic ient of s t a b i l i t y 
a f t e r 7 weeks i s found to be 0.87. The construct v a l i d i t y 
Coefficient of the scale found by co r re l a t ing i t with 
Ullmann's 12-item Facil i t at ion- inh ib i t ion Scale i s as high as 
0.80. The t rans la ted version is found to be cor re la ted 0.86 
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with the o r ig ina l vers ion . 
(d) A Tria t Adjectives Rating Scale : I t i s of the type 
which Murstein (1971) used. I t cons i s t s of 20 adject ives 
each of which the s i s required to r a t e , f i r s t in respect of 
'as he r ea l ly i s ' (real s e l f ) and then in respect of 'as he 
would l ike himself t o be ' ( ideal s e l f ) , on a seven-point 
sca le ranging fron 'most l i ke me' t o ' l e a s t l i k e me ' . After 
the S has rated a l l the adject ives both 'as he r ea l ly i s ' and 
'as he would l ike himself t o b e ' , the discrepancy between 
the two rat ings for each adjective i s calcula ted, and a l l the 
differences between the two ra t ings are t o t a l l e d without 
a lzebraic s ign. The t o t a l of the differences between the two 
ra t ings gives the discrepancy score. If the discrepancy score 
i s high, the real se l f i s perceived t o be f a l l i n g short of the 
ideal self , while i f the discrepancy score i s low the real 
s e l f i s perceived t o be c lose r t o the idea l self , the former 
indica t ing 'low self-esteem' while the l a t e r ind ica t ing 'high 
se l f -es teem' . 
Procedures 
( i ) Selection of ss 
Four samples of 100 Ss each were randomly selected from 
the male Arts undergraduate students of degree col leges in 
limphal. All the ss came from middle c lass famil ies , and t h e i r 
age range was 17 to 20 years . 
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The four personal i ty measures were administered on the 
four samples of Ss; each personal i ty measure being administered 
on a d i f ferent sample. The administration of each personal i ty 
measure was carr ied out in small groups of 5/6 Ss . For each 
persona l i ty var iab le , two groups were formed one scoring 
above P75 and the o ther scoring below P25. In t h i s manner, 
e ight groups of Ss were formed. The groups were designated 
as 'Highly Anxious' (HA) and 'Mildly Anxious' (MA), ' I n t e r n a l l y -
Oriented' (10), and 'Externally-Oriented (EO), 'Repressors ' (R) 
and ' S e n s i t i z e r s ' (S), and 'High Self-Esteem' (HSE) and 'Low 
Self-Esteem' (LSE) groups. 
For each experiment using one d i f ferent personal i ty 
va r i ab le , 20 high scorers and 20 low scorers for the personal i ty 
var iab le were randomly se lec ted . 
( i i ) Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was performed on each S ind iv idua l ly . He 
was given ins t ruc t ions regarding what he was required t o do. 
When i t was c lea r tha t he had understood What he had t o do, 
the experiment proper s t a r t e d . 
The S was required t o make a bid for a gamble in a guessing 
game. He was presented with a pa i r of two r i sk a l t e rna t i ve s 
( s t ra teg ies )^ and was required t o se lec t one a l t e r n a t i v e (s t ra tegy) 
as a bid for a gamble in the game. Whenever he t r i e d out the bid, 
he was given a pos i t ive feedback ( i . e . , was t o ld t h a t he won 
the gamble) o r a negative feedback ( i . e . , was to ld t h a t he 
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los t the gainble) according to t t e design of the experiment, 
a f te r which he was, once again, presented with the sarpe pa i r 
of the two r isk a l t e rna t i ve s ( s t r e t eg ie s ) and was required t o 
se lec t one a l t e rna t ive (s t ra tegy) ao as t o use i t as a bid in 
the garrible second t ime. This whole procedure cons t i tu ted one 
t r i a l . The san» procedure was repeated twelve t imes, so t ha t the 
S would se lec t one r i sk s t ra tegy from a p a i r of two r i sk 
s t r a t e g i e s in a gambling r i sk- tak ing two t imes, f i r s t before the 
feedback and second a f t e r the feedback, in each one of twelve 
t r i a l s . 
The experimental condition of the ' a rousa l of cognit ive 
dissonance' was Induced in half of the ss randomly selected 
from the t o t a l Ss cons t i t u t i ng each one of the two dichotomised 
groups for each persona l i ty var iab le , and the cont ro l condition 
of the 'nonarousal of cognit ive dissonance ' , in the remaining 
half of the Ss. In order t o make the s i t ua t i on appear r ea l , 
t he ss in the ' a rousal of cognit ive dissonance' condition 
were given a few t r i a l s of ' pos i t i ve feedback of winning the 
gamble' which were f i l l e r ones ( i . e . , t r i a l s which would not 
be scored), and in the s imi la r manner, the ss in the 
'nonarousal ' of cognit ive dissonance' condit ion were given a 
few t r i a l s of 'negative feedback of losing the gamble' which 
were f i l l e r ones. Further, in order to equalize the effect 
of f i l l e r t r i a l s , t h e i r number was same in both the conditions 
( i . e . , 25 per cent of the t o t a l t r i a l s ) . F i l l e r t r i a l s were 
randomly mixed with the t r i a l s which would be scored. 
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Scores 
The score i s concerned with the change in the selection 
of a risk alternative (strategy) from a pair of two risk 
alternative (strategy) choices in the second of two bids as 
compared to the f i r s t one after receiving the feedback either 
of winning the garoble (positive feedback) or of losing the 
gaxrible (negative feedback). A score of one i s given if the s 
selects in the second bid the risk strategy that has not been 
selected in the f i r s t bid, while a score of zero i s given if he 
selects in the second bid the risk strategy that has been 
selected in the f i r s t bid. In th i s way, a score of one or 
aero i s given to the s for each t r i a l , and a l l the scores are 
summed to get the t o t a l scores of him. 
I t i s to be pointed out that , according to Harris (1969), 
the reduction of cognitive dissonance i s probabi l i s t ic in 
nature, i . e . , arousal of cognitive dissonance does not always 
lead to opinion change. He has experimentally shown t h i s . In 
his opinion, the effect of cognitive dissonance may be studied 
in a be t te r way, in terms of frequency of opinion change, by 
inducing cognitive dissonance and taking the measure of 
opinion change in several t r i a l s . In the present experiment, 
the effect of cognitive dissonance upon the risk-taking 
behaviour was studied by inducing cognitive dissonance in the 
risk-taking situation and taking i t s effect upon the choice of 
risk strategy over a nvuiiber of t r i a l s . 
C h a p t e r IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1 . R e s u l t s 
The mean s c o r e s of change of r i s k s t r a t e g y u n d e r t h e a r o u s a l 
and n o n a r o u s a l of c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e c o n d i t i o n s a r e g iven i n 
T a b l e B. 
TABLE B 
Mean S c o r e s of Change o f Risk S t r a t e g y shown b y Ss 
of d i f f e r e n t P e r s o n a l i t y Groups u n d e r t h e A r o u s a l 
and N o n a r o u s a l o f C o g n i t i v e D i s s o n a n c e C o n d i t i o n s 
P e r s o n a l i t y 
Groups 
M i l d l y a n x i o u s 
H igh ly a n x i o u s 
I n t e r n a l l y - o r i e n t e d 
E x t e r n a l l y - o r i e n t e d 
High s e l f - e s t e e m 
Low s e l f - e s t e e m 
R e p r e s s o r 
S e n s i t i z e r 
The a n a l y s e s o f v a r i a n c e a p p l i e d t o t h e s c o r e s r e p r e s e n t i n g 
change of r i s k s t r a t e g y (Ta b l e s C, D, E and F) show t h a t t h e e f f e c t 
of t h e a r o u s a l and t h e n o n a r o u s a l of c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e i s 
72 
A r o u s a l o f 
C o g n i t i v e 
D i s sonance 
6 .6 
3 .8 
6 .9 
3 .7 
6 .5 
3 .9 
6 .8 
3 . 8 
N o n a r o u s a l 
of C o g n i t i v e 
D i s s o n a n c e 
3 . 6 
3 .5 
3 . 5 
3 . 4 
3 . 8 
3 . 6 
3 .7 
3 .5 
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s igni f icant beyond .001 level of confidence. As expected, the 
arousal of cognit ive dissonance leads t o nnore changes of r i sk 
s t ra tegy when compared with t he nonarousal of cognit ive of 
dissonance. Further, the r e s u l t s ind ica te t h a t the effect of each 
one of four personal i ty va r i ab l e s , namely, anxiety, i n t e r n a l -
external locus of control , self-esteem, and repress ion-
sens i t i za t ion upon change of r i sk s t ra tegy as shown in Tables 
C, D, E and F respect ively i s s ign i f i can t beyond .001 level of 
confidence. 'Mildly anxious* Ss show more changes of r i sk s t ra tegy 
than do 'h ighly anxious* Ss. Similar ly, * in terna l ly-or ien ted* 
Ss show more changes of r i sk s t r a t egy than do ' ex t e rna l ly -
oriented* Ss. Further, 'high self-esteem* Ss show more changes 
of r i sk s t ra tegy than do *low sel f -es tem' Ss, and ' repressor* ss 
show more changes of r i s k s t r a t egy than do ' s e n s i t i z e r ' Ss. 
As evident from the relevant t a b l e s , the in te rac t ion between 
cognit ive dissonance and each one of the four personal i ty va r iab les 
in affect ing change of r i sk s t r a t egy i s s ign i f icant beyond .001 
level of confidence. 'Mildly anxious' Ss placed under the condi t io 
of arousal of cognif i t ive dissonance, as seen in Table C, show 
s ign i f i can t ly more changes of r i sk s t ra tegy than do 'mildly 
anxious* Ss placed under the condit ion of nonarousal of cognit ive 
dissonance. On the other hand, 'h ighly anxious* Ss placed xinder t h 
two condit ions of arousal and nonarousal of cognit ive dissonance 
do not show any s igni f icant difference in t h e i r change of r isk 
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TABLE C 
Summary of A n a l y s i s of V a r i a n c e of t h e e f f e c t s of P e r s o n a l i t y 
Dimension of A n x i e t y and t h e A r o u s a l and N o n a r o u s a l of 
C o g n i t i v e D i s s o n a n c e C o n d i t i o n s on t h e Change of 
Risk S t r a t e g y 
Source 
C o g n i t i v e 
D i s s o n a n c e 
Anx ie ty (B) 
A X B 
Error 
Total 
( A ) 
d f . 
1 
1 
1 
36 
39 
Sums of 
squares 
27.225 
21.025 
22.225 
34.900 
105.375 
Variance 
27.225 
21.025" 
22.225 
00.969 
F . 
28.09 6 
21.698 
22.936 
-
P . 
.001 
.001 
.001 
-
s t r a t egy . That i s , for the 'highly anxious' Ss, the condition 
of arousal of cognitive dissonance when compared with the 
condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance does not lead 
to greater change of r i sk s t r a t egy . 
From the in te rac t ion between cogni t ive dissonance and 
personal i ty var iab le of in t e rna l - ex te rna l locus of cont ro l in 
affecting change of r isk s t ra tegy, as Table D shows, i t i s 
c l ea r t h a t ' i n t e r n a l l y - o r i e n t e d ' Ss placed under the condition 
of arousal of cognit ive dissonance show s ign i f i can t ly more 
changes of r i sk s t ra tegy than do ' i n t e r n a l l y - o r i e n t e d ' ss 
placed under the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance, 
On the other hand, ' ex te rna l ly -o r ien ted ' Ss placed under the 
two conditions of arousal and nonarousal of cognit ive dissonance 
do not shov/ any s igni f icant difference in t h e i r change of r i sk 
s t r a t egy . That i s , for the ' ex t e rna l ly -o r i en ted ' Ss, the 
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TABLE D 
Sumnary of A n a l y s i s of V a r i a n c e of t h e e f f e c t s of P e r s o n a l i t y 
Dimension of I n t e r n a l - E x t e r n a l Locus of C o n t r o l and t h e 
A r o u s a l and N o n a r o u s a l of C o g n i t i v e D i s s o n a n c e 
C o n d i t i o n s on t h e Change o f R i s k S t r a t e g y 
s o u r c e d f . ^"^f^^^ V a r i a n c e F . P . 
s g u a r e s 
D i s s ^ a n c f c A ) ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ 34 .225 30 .889 .001 
I n t e r n a l - E x t e r n a l 
Locus of C o n t r o l 
(B) 
A X B 
E r r o r 
T o t a l 
1 
1 
36 
39 
2 4 . 6 6 0 
2 6 . 5 9 0 
3 9 . 9 0 0 
125 .375 
2 4 . 6 6 0 
2 6 . 5 9 0 
1 .108 
22 .256 
23 .998 
.001 
.001 
c o n d i t i o n of a r o u s a l of c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e a s compared t o t h e 
t h e c o n d i t i o n of n o n a r o u s a l o f c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e d o e s n o t 
l e a d t o s i g n i f i c a n t l y more c h a n g e s of r i s k s t r a t e g y . 
R e g a r d i n g t h e i n t e r a c t i o n be tween t h e p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e 
of s e l f - e s t e e m and c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e i n a f f e c t i n g t h e change 
of r i s k s t r a t e g y ^ t h e r e s u l t s , a s s e e n i n T a b l e E, show t h a t ' h i g h 
s e l f - e s t e e m ' Ss p l a c e d u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n of a r o u s a l of 
c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e show s i g n i f i c a n t l y more c h a n g e s o f r i s k 
s t r a t e g y t h a n do ' l o w s e l f - e s t e e m ' Ss p l a c e d u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n 
of n o n a r o u s a l of c o g n i t i v e , d i s s o n a n c e . On t h e o t h e r hand, 
' low s e l f - e s t e e m ' Ss p l a c e d u n d e r t h e two c o n d i t i o n s of a r o u s a l 
and n o n a r o u s a l of c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e do n o t show any 
s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e i r change of r i s k s t r a t e g y . Tha t i s , 
f o r t h e ' low s e l f - e s t e e m Ss , t h e c o n d i t i o n of a r o u s a l o f 
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TABLE E 
Sumrrary of A n a l y s i s of V a r i a n c e of t h e e f f e c t s of P e r s o n a l i t y 
Dimension of S e l f - E s t e e m and t h e A r o u s a l and N o n a r o u s a l 
of C o q n i t i v e D i s s o n a n c e C o n d i t i o n s on t h e Change 
of R i s k S t r a t e g y 
s o u r c e d f . ^""^f °^ V a r i a n c e F . P . 
sc?uares 
C o g n i t i v e 
D i s sonance (A) 
S e l f - E s t e e m ( B ) 
A X B 
E r r o r 
T o t a l 
1 
1 
1 
36 
39 
2 2 . 5 0 0 
1 9 . 6 0 0 
1 4 . 4 0 0 
35 .400 
9 1 . 9 0 0 
2 2 . 5 0 0 
1 9 . 6 0 0 
1 4 . 4 0 0 
0 0 . 9 8 3 
22 .889 . 
19 .939 
14 .649 ' 
. 0 0 1 
. 0 0 1 
. 0 0 1 
c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e a s compared t o t h e c o n d i t i o n o f n o n a r o u s a l 
of c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e does n o t l e a d t o s i g n i f i c a n t l y more 
changes of r i s k s t r a t e g y . 
As f o r t h e i n t e r a c t i o n be tween t h e p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e of 
r e p r e s s i o n - s e n s i t i z a t i o n and c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e i n a f f e c t i n g 
t h e change of r i s k s t r a t e g y , t h e r e s u l t s , a s g iven i n T a b l e F, 
show t h a t ' r e p r e s s o r ' Ss p l a c e d u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n of a r o u s a l of 
TABLE F 
Summary of A n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e of t h e e f f e c t s of P e r s o n a l i t y 
Dimension of R e p r e s s i o n - s e n s i t i z a t i o n and t h e A r o u s a l and 
N o n a r o u s a l of C o g n i t i v e D i s s o n a n c e C o n d i t i o n s on t h e 
Change of Risk S t r a t e g y 
Source 
C o g n i t i v e 
D i s s o n a n c e (A) 
R e p r e s s i o n -
s e n s i t i z a t i o n (B) 
A X B 
E r r o r 
T o t a l 
d f . 
1 
1 
1 
36 
39 
Sums o f 
s q u a r e s 
28 .900 
25 .600 
19 .600 
43 .800 
117 .900 
V a r i a n c e 
2 8 . 9 0 0 
2 5 . 6 0 0 
1 9 . 6 0 0 
1.217 
F . 
23 .739 
21 .035 
16 .105 
P . 
. 001 
.001 
. 001 
cognitive dissonance show s ign i f i can t ly more changes of r i sk 
s t ra tegy than do ' repressor ' Ss placed under the condition of 
nonarousal of cognitive dissonance. On the o ther hand, 
' s e n s i t i z e r ' Ss placed under the two condit ions of arousal 
and nonarousal of cognit ive dissonance do not show any 
s igni f icant difference in t h e i r change of r isk s t r a t egy . That 
i s , for the ' s e n s i t i z e r ' Ss, the condition of arousal of 
cognitive dissonance as compared t o the condition of nonarousal 
of cognitive dissonance does not lead t o s ign i f i can t ly more 
changes of r i sk s t r a t egy . 
In summary, the main findings of the present study are 
as follows: 
1. The arousal of cognitive dissonance leads to s ign i f i can t ly 
more changes of r i sk s t ra tegy than does the nonarousal of 
cognitive dissonance. 
2. The 'mildly anxious' and 'highj.y anxious' Ss equally lack 
the tendency to change r isk s t ra tegy when there is nonarousal 
of cognit ive dissonance. On the other hand, when there i s arousal 
of cognit ive dissonance the 'mildly anxious' Ss show a s i gn i f i can t ly 
greater tendency to change r isk s t r a t egy than do the 'h ighly 
anxious• Ss, 
3 . The nonarousal of cognitive dissonance produces a tendency 
to repeat r isk s t ra tegy for both the ' i n t e rna l l y -o r i en t ed ' and 
' ex te rna l ly -o r ien ted ' Ss. On the o ther hand, the ' in te imal ly 
or iented ' Ss show a s ign i f i can t ly g rea te r tendency to change r i sk 
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s t r a t egy than do the ' ex te rna l ly -o r i en ted ' Ss, when there i s 
arousal of cognitive dissonance. 
4. Both the 'high se l f - e s t eon ' and 'low self-esteem' Ss show 
a tendency to repeat r isk s t ra tegy when there i s nonarousal 
of cognit ive dissonance. On the o ther hand, the 'high se l f -
esteem' Ss show a s ign i f i can t ly grea te r tendency to change r isk 
s t ra tegy than do the 'low self -es teem' Ss,when there is arousal 
of cognit ive dissonance. 
5. For both the ' r epressor ' and ' s e n s i t i z e r ' Ss, the non-
arousal of cognitive dissonance leads to a tendency to repeat 
r isk s t r a t egy . On the other hand, when there i s arousal of 
cognit ive dissonance the ' r ep ressor ' Ss show a s i gn i f i can t ly 
grea ter tendency to change r isk s t r a t egy than do the ' s e n s i t i z e r ' 
Ss. 
2. Discussion 
The findings of s ign i f i can t ly grea ter changes of r i sk 
s t r a t egy under the condition of arousal of cognit ive dissonance 
than under the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance, 
as shown in Tables C, D, E and F, confirm the f i r s t hypothesis . 
When the choice of a r i sk s t r a t egy i s pos i t ive ly reinforced by 
a feedback of winning the gamble, i t i s na tura l for the Ss to 
have s a t i s f ac t i on with the r i sk s t ra tegy , and thus to have a 
tendency not to change the r i sk s t ra tegy in the subsequent t r i a l . 
Conversely, i f the choice of a r i sk s t ra tegy i s negat ively 
reinforced by a feedback of los ing the gamble, i t is obvious 
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tha t the ss wi l l have d i s sa t i s f ac t ion with the s t ra tegy a.nc' 
w i l l have a tendency to change i t in the subsequent t r i a l . 
Kogan and Wallach (1964) report in t h e i r study tha t the ss 
show a tendency to have sa t i s fac t ion with the r i sk s t r a t egy 
tha t has been chosen in the previous t r i a l . However, they 
do not mention any th ing about the difference betv?een the 
pos i t ive feedback of winning the gamble and the negative 
feedback of losing the gamble in t h e i r effects upon the choice 
of r i sk s t r a t egy . 
As expected^ 'mildly anxious' Ss, ' i n t e rna l l y -o r i en t ed ' ss , 
'high self-esteem' Ss as well as 'rep3:?essor' Ss are found t o be 
affected by the arousal of cognitive dissonance, while 'highly 
anxious' Ss, ' ex te rna l ly -o r ien ted ' ss , 'low self -es teem' Ss, as 
well as ' s e n s i t i z e r ' Ss are found to be less affected by i t in 
t h e i r choice of r isk s t r a t egy . 
The finding shows tha t 'mildly anxious' Ss are r e a l i s t i c 
in t h e i r choice of r i sk s t r a t egy . Their s a t i s f ac t ion or 
d i s sa t i s f ac t i on with a r i sk s t ra tegy depends upon whether a choice 
of i t i s followed by a pos i t ive or a negative reinforcement. If 
a choice of a r isk s t rage ty i s followed by a pos i t ive feedback 
of winnina the gamble the s t ra tegy is more l i k e l y to be 
repeated, and if, on the o ther hand, the choice i s followed by a 
negative feedback of los ing the gamble the s t r a t egy i s more l i ke ly 
to be dropped in favour of another s t r a t egy . 'Highly anxious' 
Ss, on the other hand, are found to be maladaptive in dealing 
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with cognitive dissonance in a r i sk- tak ing s i t u a t i o n . That 
they have a tendency t o choose the same r isk s t ra tegy 
i r respec t ive of the nature of reinforcement indica tes that 
they are indi f ferent to the r e a l i t y of the s i t u a t i o n . That 
i s , in dealing with cognitive dissonance in a r i sk- taking 
s i tua t ion they behave in an ego-defensive manner. m other 
words, they seem to be not so much concerned with an achievement 
of a goal, as they are with defence of t h e i r ego. I t appears 
tha t for them change of s t ra tegy a f t e r receiving negative 
information of losing a gamble i s a sign of t h e i r admitting 
f a i l u r e . By not changing the s t ra tegy they appear t o protect 
themselves from having to recognize tha t they have l o s t the 
gamble. I t may be recalled from Chapter I tha t Handler and 
Sarason (1952) consider anxiety to be the source of self-
oriented and t a sk - i r r e l evan t responses which tend to i n t e r f e re 
with task-re levant responses and thus make an individual 
maladaptive in h is behaviour. Further, i t has been reported tha t 
people with a high level of anxiety tend to be r ig id and 
inf lex ib le in t h e i r approach to a problem (Cowen, 1952a, 1952b; 
Jones, 1954; Longenecker, 19 62). 
Regarding the behaviour of the ' i n t e rna l l y -o r i en t ed ' Ss 
in dealing with cognitive dissonance in a r i sk - tak ing s i t ua t ion , 
i t i s found from Table D tha t , they have a tendency to repeat 
a r i sk s t r a t egy a f t e r a posi t ive feedback of winndLng the gamble 
and to change the s t ra tegy af ter a negative feedback of los ing 
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the gamble. This tendency can very well be explained by the 
simple pr inc ip le of reinforcement. I t i s quite obvious tha t 
when a chosen s t ra tegy i s pos i t ive ly reinforced by giving the 
Ss a posi t ive feedback they tend to repeat the s t ra tegy , and 
when i t i s negat ively reinforced by giving the Ss a negative 
feedback they tend t o change i t . That i s , in dealing with 
cognit ive dissonance in r i sk- tak ing s i t ua t ion these Ss make 
changes in t h e i r responses according t o the demand of the 
s i t u a t i o n . This adjustment to the pos i t ive and the negative 
feedback indica tes tha t these Ss t r y t o exercise control over the 
outcome of t h e i r ac t ion . This finding i s , thus, consis tent 
with the be l i e f of ' i n t e rna l l y -o r i en t ed ' Ss tha t , reinforcements 
are contingent upon t h e i r own act ions and hence are under t h e i r 
own con t ro l . 
As may be observed from Table D, the s t r i k i n g finding 
concerning the behaviour of ' ex te rna l ly -o r ien ted ' Ss in deal ing 
with cognitive dissonance in a r i sk - t ak ing s i tua t ion i s the 
lack of proper adjustment to a feedback. They show a tendency 
to repeat a choice of a r i sk s t ra tegy regardless of whether the 
choice i s reinforced by a posi t ive feedback of winning the 
gamble or by a negative feedback of los ing the gamble. This 
tendency may be in terpre ted to mean t h a t these Ss bel ieve the 
outcome of t h e i r action being determined by factors over which 
they have no con t ro l . I t appears, they are convinced tha t 
v/inning the gamble does not depend on whether one chooses t h i s 
s t ra tegy or t h a t , and i t depends e n t i r e l y on chance. I t i s t h i s 
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bel ie f in the external locus of cont ro l i t s e l f which prevents 
the ' ex te rna l ly -o r ien ted ' Ss from making necessary adjustment 
to negative feedback of losing the gamble. 
From the resu l t s obtained in Table E, i t i s found t h a t 
'high se l f -es teem' Ss and 'low self-esteem' Ss d i f fe r in t h e i r 
approach t o cognitive dissonance in a r i sk - t ak ing s i t u a t i o n . 
'High sel f -es teem' Ss have a tendency to repeat a r isk s t r a t egy 
in a condition where there i s an arousal of cognitive 
dissonance whereas, 'low self-esteem' Ss, on the other hand, 
show a tendency to repeat a choice of a r i sk s t ra tegy regardless 
of whether the choice i s reinforced by a pos i t ive feedback of 
winning the gamble or by a negative feedback of los ing the 
gamble. The behaviour of these ss may be explained in the l i g h t 
of what has been mentioned in Chapter I . t ha t the individual in 
his ac t ions , t r i e s to be consis tent with how he perceives himself 
in r e l a t ion to his idea l - se l f . If h is self-esteem i s high and 
he perceives himself to be worthy, l ikeab le , competent, e t c . , 
t h i s i s bound to influence his act ion, in so far as he wi l l 
tend to exer t himself to l ive upto these self-perceived 
q u a l i t i e s and thus achieve b e t t e r adjustment in l i f e s i t u a t i o n s . 
On the o ther hand, if his self-esteem is low and he perceives 
himself to be unworthy, unlikeable,incompetent, e t c . , he tends 
to behave in a way which is consis tent with these self-
perceived q u a l i t i e s , and t h i s wi l l l i k e l y make him fa i l to 
achieve b e t t e r adjustment in l i f e s i t u a t i o n s . 
As the 3?esults in Table P ind ica te , ' r epressor ' 3s show 
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proper adjustment in deal ing with cocni t ive dissonance in a 
r i sk- tak ing s i tua t ion , while ' s e n s i t i z e r ' Ss show a lack of 
adjustment in such a s i t u a t i o n . The former Ss have a tendency 
to repeat choice of a r isk s t ra tegy when i t i s reinforced by a 
posi t ive feedback of winning the gamble and t o change the 
s t ra tegy when i t i s reinforfed by a negative feedback of los ing 
the gamble, whereas the l a t e r Ss have a tendency to repeat 
the choice i r respec t ive of whether i t is reinforced by a 
posi t ive feedback or by a negative feedback. This finding i s 
consis tent with what has been mentioned in Chapter I t ha t 
repressors show b e t t e r adjustment than do s e n s i t i z e r s (Byrne, 
1961; Byrne, Barry, and Nelson, 1963; Byrne, Golightly, and 
Sheffield, 1965; Cohen and Foerst, 1968; Peder, 1967; Joy, 
1963; Lucky and Grigg, 1964; Tempone and Lamb, 1967). As i t 
has been mentioned in that chapter, Lefcourt (1966), in a study 
obtained r e su l t s ind ica t ing tha t repressors had grea ter a b i l i t y 
to control emotions than did s e n s i t i z e r s . Individuals who 
are capable of con t ro l l ing t h e i r emotions are expected t o 
exercise s e l f - r e s t r a i n t b e t t e r than those who are swayed by 
t h a i r emotions and with s e l f - r e s t r a i n t one can deal with 
s i t ua t i ons more adequately. 
Chapte r V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The present study was undertaken with the sole purpose of 
ascer ta in ing experimentally the effect of cognit ive dissonance 
upon r i sk- taking behaviour in re la t ion to four personal i ty 
va r iab les , namely, anxiety, in te rna l -ex te rna l locus of control , 
self-esteem, and r ep ress ion- sens i t i za t ion . 
A r i sk- tak ing s i tua t ion was used in the present study on 
ce r ta in grounds t h a t , ( i ) when the Ss are ' t a sk- involved ' , 
i . e . , are required t o be objective in expressing t h e i r opinion, 
any coiranunication which i s discrepant with t h e i r ex i s t ing 
opinion wi l l arouse cognit ive dissonance, and in a r i sk- tak ing 
s i tua t ion the Ss are expected to be ' t a sk -o r i en ted ' in so far 
as they are required to be objective in t h e i r choice of r i sk 
a l t e rna t ives each r i sk a l t e rna t ive being based on informations 
indicat ing probabi l i ty of success and amoxint of payoff> and 
( i i ) there has been scant a t ten t ion to study the effect of 
cognitive dissonance upon r i sk- tak ing behaviour. The present 
study i s an improvement over the sole study (Kogan and Wallach, 
1964) inves t iga t ing the effect of cognit ive dissonance upon 
r i sk- taking behaviour in so far as the arousal of cognitive 
dissonance was induced experimentally by giving the s the 
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discrepant information of losing a gamble and as the possible 
effect of r i sk leve l upon the change of r i sk a l t e rna t ive was 
removed by making the two r i sk a l t e rna t ives presented to the 
S in a pair , of the same r i sk l e v e l . 
Assuming t h a t the manner of reducing cognit ive dissonance 
of an individual may be re la ted to his posi t ion on adjustment-
maladjustment dimension in such a way tha t a f a c i l i t a t i v e 
response involving adjustments and necessary modifications being 
used by a well-adjusted individual and a d e b i l i t a t i v e one 
involving some kind of defense mechanism being used by a 
maladjusted individual , the four personal i ty va r iab les , namely, 
anxiety, i n t e m a l - e x t e n n a l locus of cont ro l , self-esteem, and 
repress ion-sens i t i za t ion — each of which considered to play a 
v i t a l irole in the adjustment-maladjustment of an individual — 
were included in the present study. 
Four experiments, each one using Ss varying on one d i f ferent 
personal i ty dimension, were perfoimed so t h a t the r e s u l t s 
obtained in one experiment may be ve r i f i ed in the remaining 
three experiments. 
All the hypotheses were confirmed. The s t r i k i n g s imi l a r i t y 
in the findings of the four experiments j u s t i f i e s the performing 
of four d i f ferent experiments, and i t implies tha t the four 
personal i ty va r iab les are re la ted to each other and to one 
common dimension which may be known as adjustment-maladjustment. 
Had the measures of the four personal i ty va r i ab les been applied 
to one s ingle sample of Ss, i t would have been possible to 
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determine in t e rco r re l a t ions among the four personal i ty va r iab les 
and also to do factor analysis of the measures with a view to 
developing a measure of adjustment-maladjustment. 
I t i s to be pointed out t ha t , in the study by Kogan and 
Wallach (1964) since pos i t ive and negative feedbacks were not 
experimentally induced i t was d i f f i c u l t t o find out the 
difference of t h e i r e f fec ts upon the change of r i sk s t r a t egy . 
Of course, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o induce experimentally feedbacks 
in a gambling r i sk- tak ing s i t u a t i o n . The present study attempted 
to induce feedbacks experimentally by giving the s verbal 
communication of declar ing him as t o have won or as t o have 
los t the gamble. The study may be repeated by using a r i sk - t ak ing 
task in which a mechanical device giving preprogrammed feedbacks 
as desired by the experimenter may be employed. Feedback given 
by a mechanical device may be taken as more trustworthy than t h a t 
provided by the 'experimenter ' who may be regarded as the 
'manipulator ' of conditions a t l eas t by some enlightened 
subjects . 
/ 
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APPEHDIX ' A ' 
Anag rams u s e d i n t h e R i s k - T a k i n g T a s k 
A W S 
U T B 
A \'} R 
O G D 
E N T 
O N T 
A D M 
A P L 
A N P 
A N B 
i i 
APPENDIX ' B ' 
INSTRUCTIONS 
There a r e t e n a n a g r a m s . Each anagram i s amenable t o two 
d i f f e r e n t s o l u t i o n s of m e a n i n g f u l words , and which one o f t h e 
two s o l u t i o n s i s t o be r e g a r d e d a s c o r r e c t in a g iven t r i a l 
h a s b e e n d e t e r m i n e d e a r l i e r i n a t a b l e . You a r e r e q u i r e d t o 
gamble i n g u e s s i n g which of t h e two s o l u t i o n s i s c o r r e c t . You 
a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o win t h e gamble i f you a r e a b l e t o gues s t h e 
c o r r e c t s o l u t i o n s of a t l e a s t a s p e c i f i e d number of anagrams 
wh ich you i n t e n d t o g u e s s c o r r e c t l y . 
The gambl ing w i l l b e s p r e a d o v e r s e v e r a l t r i a l s . In e a c h 
t r i a l , you w i l l be p r e s e n t e d w i t h a p a i r of two r i s k a l t e r n a t i v e s 
from which you a r e r e q u i r e d t o s e l e c t any one a s a b i d f o r t h e 
g a m b l e . A r i s k a l t e r n a t i v e i s e x p r e s s e d i n t e r r a s of t h e c h a n c e s 
of l o s i n g t h e gamble and t h e complementa ry c h a n c e s of w i n n i n g 
i t . I t d e t e r m i n e s t h e number o f anagrams you a r e r e q u i r e d t o 
g u e s s c o r r e c t l y , in o r d e r t o win t h e gamble , from a number of 
anagrams you a r e a l lowed t o t r y . Fo r example , a r i s k a l t e r n a t i v e 
i n d i c a t i n g 2 /5 c h a n c e s of l o s i n g t h e gamble i m p l i e s t h a t you w i l l 
b e r e q u i r e d t o guess a t l e a s t two anagrams c o r r e c t l y , i n o r d e r 
t o win t h e gamble, from a t o t a l of f i v e anagrams you a r e a l l owed 
t o t r y . S i m i l a r l y , a r i s k a l t e r n a t i v e i n d i c a t i n g 4 /10 c h a n c e s 
of l o s i n g t h e gaKible i m p l i e s t h a t you w i l l b e r e q u i r e d t o 
g u e s s a t l e a s t f o u r anagrams c o r r e c t l y , i n o r d e r t o win t h e 
camble , from a t o t a l of t e n anagrams you a r e a l l o w e d t o t r y . 
i i i 
'.Then you choose a r i sk a l t e rna t ive as a bid and t r y i t 
out in the gamble by guessing the correct solut ions of the 
anagrams, you wi l l be declared e i t h e r as t o have won the 
gamble in case you are able, o r as to have l o s t the gamble 
in case you are not able, t o guess the correct solut ions of 
at l e a s t a specified number of anagrams which you propose to 
guess co r r ec t ly . 
IV 
APPENDIX 'C* 
A d j e c t i v e s i n c l u d e d in t h e T r a i t A d j e c t i v e s 
R a t i n g S c a l e u s e d f o r t h e measure of 
s e l f - E s t e e m 
A c t i v e 
Anxious 
Competent 
C o n c e i t e d 
Conforming 
C r e a t i v e 
Firm 
F l e x i b l e 
I m i t a t i v e 
Incompeten t 
I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c 
I n t e l l i g e n t 
Lax 
L e t h a r g i c 
Mediocre 
Modest 
P r a g m a t i c 
Relaxed 
R i g i d 
U n r e a l i s t i c 
APPENDIX 'D »n« 
P a i r s of R isk A l t e r n a t i v e s a s P r e s e n t e d t o t h e s i n t h e 
E x p e r i m e n t 
T r i a l 
N o . 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0 
1 1 
12 
ALTERNATIVE I 
C h a n c e s 
o f 
l o s i n g 
2 / 5 
1 /5 
3 / 5 
2 / 5 
1 /5 
1 /5 
2 / 5 
1 /5 
3 / 5 
3 / 5 
3 / 5 
2 / 5 
C h a n c e s 
o f 
w i n n i n g 
3 / 5 
4 / 5 
2 / 5 
3 / 5 
4 / 5 
4 / 5 
3 / 5 
4 / 5 
2 / 5 
2 / 5 
2 / 5 
3 / 5 
ALTSRIVIATIVE I I 
C h a n c e s 
o f 
l o s i n g 
4 / 1 0 
2 / 1 0 
6 / 1 0 
4 / 1 0 
2 / 1 0 
2 / 1 0 
4 / 1 0 
2 / 1 0 
6 / 1 0 
6 / 1 0 
6 / 1 0 
4 / 1 0 
C h a n c e s 
o f 
w i n n i n g 
6 / 1 0 
8 / 1 0 
4 / 1 0 
6 / 1 0 
8 / 1 0 
8 / 1 0 
6 / 1 0 
8 / 1 0 
4 / 1 0 
4 / 1 0 
4 / 1 0 
6 / 1 0 
AMOUNT TO BE LOST OR 
TO BE WON 
Amount o f 
b e l o s t 
( R s . ) 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 0 5 
Amount o f 
b e won 
( R s . ) 
0 . 1 5 
0 . 1 0 
0 . 2 5 
0 . 1 5 
0 . 1 0 
0 . 1 0 
0 . 1 5 
0 . 1 0 
0 . 2 5 
0 . 2 5 
0 . 2 5 
0 . 1 5 
v i 
APPENDIX 'E < p » 
Programme of Feecibacks u n d e r t h e C o n d i t i o n of 
A r o u s a l of C o g n i t i v e D i s s o n a n c e 
T r i a l 
No. N a t u r e of Feedback 
1 N e g a t i v e Feedback 
2 N e g a t i v e Feedback 
3 N e g a t i v e Feedback 
f4 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
5 N e g a t i v e Feedback 
6 N e g a t i v e Feedback 
7 N e g a t i v e Feedback 
f8 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
9 N e g a t i v e Feedback 
10 N e g a t i v e Feedback 
f l l P o s i t i v e Feedback 
12 N e g a t i v e Feedback 
f F i l l e r t r i a l . 
V I X 
APPENDIX ' P ' 
Programme of Feedbacks under t h e Condit ion of 
Nonarousal of Cogni t ive Dissonance 
T r i a l 
No. Nature of Feedback 
1 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
2 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
3 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
f4 Negative Feedback 
5 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
6 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
7 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
f8 Negat ive Feedback 
9 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
10 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
f l l Negative Feedback 
12 P o s i t i v e Feedback 
f F i l l e r t r i a l . 
